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Introduction

law historically recognized two defenses

recovery in negligence

suits:

Contributory negligence

and assumption of the

is

risk

that served as total bars to

Contributory negligence and assumption of risk.

based on the principle of unreasonable conduct by the plaintiff

is

based on a voluntary and knowing encounter with a risk

created by the defendant. In claiming such a bar to recovery, the defendant could
alternatively point out conduct

by the

plaintiff that the court could construe as either

unreasonable or as evincing an agreement to accept the risk of injury.

Before the advent of comparative

fault principles, distinguishing the plaintiffs

behavior as either unreasonable or evincing agreement was not crucial to the outcome of
the case at bar as either served as a total bar to recovery.

of comparative
complete bar
recovery

fault, the

However, with the acceptance

unreasonable conduct of the plaintiff no longer serves as a
reducing recovery (in

to recovery, instead

if the plaintiff acted in

a

many jurisdictions

more culpable manner than

eliminating

the defendant).

Assumption of risk, a corollary doctrine of contributory negligence, presently remains a
total

bar to recovery even in those states that have adopted comparative

With the advent of comparative

fault, the distinction

plaintiffs agreement to encounter a risk has

1

It

was not necessary

to distinguish

among

become

fault.

between plaintiffs

crucial because

it

now means

al..

Torts §68

at

44 1

th

(5

ed.

and

that

the different forms of assumption of risk before

comparative negligence came about because the outcome was always the same. Today

Prosser et

fault

1

984).

it

is

a problem.

2

the plaintiff either recovers (minus any fault attributable to the plaintiff) or doesn't

recover at

remain today: What should the courts do when

Critical questions

all.

plaintiffs conduct could be characterized as both unreasonable and as an agreement to

accept a

known danger? How do

unreasonable?

the courts determine whether the conduct

How do the courts determine

whether

plaintiffs

was

have knowingly and

voluntarily accepted a risk?

Attempts

to address these questions

have resulted

in further distinction

assumption of risk into two categories: Express and implied.
risk exists

when

of contract.

3

there

is

of

Express assumption of

an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant as in the form

In this category, there

is

no question of the proper application of the

doctrine to bar recovery to the plaintiff.

On the

contrary, implied assumption of risk

the plaintiffs behavior.

It

is

based on agreement implied from

bars recovery for injuries sustained

when

encounter with a defendant whose negligent behavior harms the
category where there

is

there

plaintiff.

an express agreement to encounter a known

is

a voluntary

Unlike the

first

risk, the

acquiescence in the second category on the plaintiffs part to assume such a risk comes

from the plaintiffs behavior when he encounters the known

risk,

not any express

agreement between plaintiff and defendant. Additionally, plaintiffs acquiescence under

~

See, for example, Spell,

Stemming

the Tide

of Expanding

Liability:

The Coexistence of Comparative

Negligence and Assumption of Risk, 8 Miss. L. Rev. 159, 162 (1988).

3

Common examples

include written waivers of liability between participants in sporting events and

the sponsor(s) of that event.

1994) highlights a
event.

Whalen

common example

v.

BMW of North America, Inc., 864 F.Supp.

131 (S.D. Cal.

of participants' releasing sponsors from harm during a sporting

3

this

category of assumption of risk occurs despite plaintiff being aware of defendant's

negligent conduct. Implied assumption of risk

behavior by the

is

based on a form of agreement from

4

plaintiff.

Courts have had

much

under comparative

difficulty

fault principles

The

application of implied assumption of risk in negligence cases.

doctrine to the

now outmoded

with the

similarity of this

theory of contributory negligence bears a closer

examination. If contributory negligence

is

no longer

in use in

46

states

6
,

why does

principle remain in certain negligence claims, where implied assumption of risk

complete defense

4

The problem with

the

may be

a

claim? This article examines the problems that this

to the plaintiffs

these different types of assumptions of risk

comes from examining

the underlying

terms of "consent" and "acquiescence" which are synonyms for the word "agreement." They carry
with them diametrically opposed types of behavior

in

terms of the plaintiffs conduct

when

encountering the defendant's negligently created situation.

Consent

"is an act

of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing as

balance the good or evil on each side.

exercise of sufficient mental capacity to

another."

Black's

Law Dictionary

Acquiescence
compliance or

lies in

57B Am.

Jur.

make an

305 (6

2D

act."

intelligent choice to

in the

possession and

do something proposed by

th

ed. 1991).

the middle ground

satisfaction; distinguished

which implies a deliberate

5

means voluntary agreement by a person

It

in a

between consent and opposition.

It is

"passive

from avowed consent" and "differs from 'confirmation,'

Id, at 24.

Negligence §§ 1201-1206 (1989). Scholars, practitioners and jurists generally

agree that assumption of risk

is

inconsistent with the fault apportioning system of comparative

negligence. See also Annotation, Effect ofAdoption of Comparative Negligence Rules on Assumption

of Risk, 16 A.L.R. 4

6

th

700, 703 (1982) (1999 supplement).

57BAm.Jur. 2d NEGLIGENCE §§ 1300 and 1751 (1989).

4

category of assumption of risk presents in jurisdictions applying comparative fault
principles.

Consider the following cases.

A. The case of the thwarted verdict
Frank Harris was an experienced ironworks contractor working

was

injured

when

the

uninsulated power

boom

line.

He

Arkansas

who

crane he was working near came into contact with an

took his employer to court

should have been de-energized

to ensure safe

7
,

at fault.

claiming that the power line

working conditions. As a

to recover for his injuries, the jury found that Mr. Harris

defendant was 85 percent

in

was

1

result

of the

5 percent at fault

trial

and the

Accordingly, they apportioned damages of $90,000
o

among

the parties in their respective

manners of fault.

Unfortunately for Mr. Harris, the jury also found that he had assumed the risk of
his injuries. This

Based on
motion

to

assumption was the basis for a 15 percent reduction in Harris' damages.

this particular finding, the District

Court of Arkansas granted defendant's

have the case dismissed notwithstanding the verdict.

In dismissing the case, the Court stated,

In candor. .the jury probably did not
.

the assumption of risk defense
plaintiffs action.

7

8

know, or

would

For the purposes of

intend, that their finding

on

constitute a complete bar to the

this

opinion

it is

assumed

that, if a

In a jurisdiction following comparative fault principles.

Harris

v.

Hercules Incorporated, 328 F.Supp. 360 (Ark. 1971). Hence, the jury found that Mr. Harris

should recover $76,500 ($90,000 minus 15 percent attributable to his

9

Id.., at

363.

fault).

5

hearing were permitted on

this issue,

it

would

result in the

conclusion that

the jury believed, and intended, that their verdict would result

judgment

in favor

of the plaintiff for $90,000.00 reduced by

15%

in

a

as in the

ordinary comparative negligence case.
* * *

The Court

impressed with plaintiffs argument and agrees that the

is

doctrine of assumption of risk as a complete bar

philosophy

comparative

behind

findings].

However,

of the

of Arkansas.

state

this

Court

The case

bound

inconsistent with the

statutes

[and

in this instance to

the

jury's

apply the law

10

The decision was affirmed by

B.

is

negligence

is

the Court of Appeals.

of the sentient eight year old

Scott Harvard

was an eight-year old boy who often played

at his

neighbor and

mother's fiance's house with Louis Sidre, a 10 year old boy. About two weeks after

Christmas they played together alone
seeing

who

could hold the match longer. The

a dried out Christmas tree.

on

his belly

bed

in

in Louis'

The

tree caught

on

house and decided to play with matches,

game progressed
fire accidentally;

into the living

room near

Louis was able to crawl

toward an open window and escape. Scott's body was

later

found under a

an adjacent room.
In directing the

trial

court to enter

summary judgment

for the defendant-parents of

Louis on various counts including negligence, the Court of Appeals of Georgia found that
the 8 year old

Id., at

boy had assumed the

363-364.

455 F.2d 267 (8

th

Cir. 1972).

risk

of his injuries and thus was responsible for his

6

own

death.

"

presumption

The

court's reliance on the elements of assumption of risk

that a child of

was based on

the

age eight has sufficient capacity to appreciate the chain of

events that could cause this type of danger.

13

The

issue

was precluded from reaching a

14

jury.

The

C.

case of the thwarted verdict,

Sammie

Jones was operating a snow blower outside his

jammed. He picked up

12

13

Stewart

v.

Harvard,

Yet, no mention

II

a tree branch

et al.,

and shoved

it

into the

home when

blower

the blower

to clear the

snow

out.

239 Ga. App. 388, 520 S.E.2d 752 (1999).

was made of actual recognition of harm

discussion, the court relied on

Vaughn

v. Pleasant,

related to the risks undertaken.

In

its

266 Ga. 862, 471 S.E.2d 866 (1996), where the

elements of assumption of risk are: Actual knowledge of the danger; understanding and appreciating
the risks associated with such danger, and; voluntary exposure to the those risks.

Here, the surviving 10 year old's testimony illustrates that the only risk the boys appreciated

was

the

court, in

match producing heat on
its

their fingers, leading

ruling, implies that the

boys were able

a Christmas tree that should have been taken

to

them

make

down some

to

blow the matches

out.

Id., at

756. The

a causal connection between a match head,

time earlier, and death from

smoke

inhalation.

14

Thus, a jury never heard the issue of whether the boy had sufficient faculty to appreciate such a risk

leading to his death.

Consider James Mansfield, Informed Choice

wherein he

states,

class of results.
in

in the

Law of Torts,

22 La.L.Rev. 17 (1961),

"Risk imparts a point of view, an estimate of the likelihood of a future result or

One may have knowledge of a

terms of the likelihood of a future result."

present fact and yet

Id., at

24.

fail

to attach

any significance

to

it

7

Two

girls

walked by and, as Mr. Jones admired them with

his

hand

in

the maehine, he

stuck his right hand too far into the blower, severely injuring two fingers on his hand.

He
that

readily admitted that he never read the brochure (at

trial

Mr. Jones conceded

he did not read the operating manual "completely and thoroughly

through") and
hand.

16

knew

The jury,

that if

all the

in splitting

damages equally between

defendant's motion to alter or

the plaintiff

risk

snow thrower with twig from

tree

and the defendant,

of harm to himself.

amend judgment,

the District Court in

Pennsylvania held that since conduct of plaintiff in pushing snow

down

emission chute of

branch could only be characterized as negligence and

did not rise to level of waiver or consent, no charge on assumption of risk
as to negligence cause of action against manufacturer.

Court of Appeals.

D.

The

way

he intentionally put his hand in the chute that he might hurt his

found that the plaintiff had voluntarily assumed the

On

ls

was warranted

The decision was affirmed by

the

17

case of the well-chosen rule of law

Mr. Decker, a resident of Pennsylvania, bought some farm equipment in
Pennsylvania that was manufactured by the defendant in Wisconsin. Sustaining injuries
at his

residence as a result of the use of the equipment, he sued in a diversity action in

Jones

v.

M.T.D. Products,

Inc.,

16

Id., at 9.

649F.2d859(3dCir.

1981).

507 F.Supp. 8 (Penn. 1980).

Wisconsin

federal court.

18

Prior to the

trial,

the parties submitted briefs in support of

which rule of law should apply: Pennsylvania's

rule

of contributory negligence

19

(thus

barring the claim), or Wisconsin's rule of comparative negligence with no recognition of

assumption of risk.
It

was no

surprise then that the defendants argued that Pennsylvania

law applied

with the plaintiff countermanding that the Wisconsin law applied. Wisconsin, which uses

an approach based on Leflar's "choice influencing factors"
applied

its

own

in

governing choice of law,

law, finding that "this forum's governmental interests

by the adoption of a

rule

under which no apportionment of fault

is

would be damaged

possible."

21

Basing

its

decision on the history of equitable results achieved with comparative fault rather than
the Pennsylvania law of contributory negligence, the Court found that application of

18

19

20

Decker

v.

Fox River Tractor

In effect at the

Co.,

324 F.Supp. 1089 (Wis. 1971).

time the case was decided.

Wisconsin use of Professor Leflar's approach uses a combination of five choice influencing

factors:

Predictability of results; maintenance of interstate and international order; simplification of the
judicial task;

law.

Henna

advancement of the forum's governmental
Hill

interests, and; application

Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law

in the Courts,

of the better rule of

34 Mercer L. Rev. 521

(1983).
In applying

its

own law

allow the plaintiff to proceed

to the case at bar, the

in his

Court relied heavily on the

last

two

factors to

cause of action that might have otherwise been barred in

Pennsylvania. 324 F.Supp. 1089, 1090-2.

A

relevant criticism of this approach

can be evaluated differently by different
its

21

own

law. 34

Mercer

L. Rev. 521.

324 F.Supp. 1089, 1091.

is

states.

that

it is

indefinite

In practice, the

and uncertain since the five factors

forum usually

selects as the better rule

9

foreign state law would result in "den[ying] an injured person

and for the resulting

his responsibility for the accident

In the four cases above, a

injuries

all

compensation although

may be

problem becomes immediately

minor.""

clear.

In the first three

cases, the court misapplied secondary assumption of risk because the doctrine retains

contributory negligence principles and

is

confusing to apply

of risk was used to deny the claim without regard

(in the first

to the findings

case assumption

of the jury). Such

confusion on the courts' part thwarts juries attempts to dispense corrective justice.

2

In

the fourth case dealing with an issue of conflict of laws, the court refused to permit

assumption of risk principles
its

to

apply to the case before

choice of law rules that Wisconsin law

is

it

went

to trial.

It

claimed under

superior to the inequitable results that might

otherwise be achieved with the application of Pennsylvania law.

The

difficulty in this application

following comparative fault
fault or

is

of secondary assumption of risk in courts

determining two threshold issues: Whether comparative

assumption of risk applies, and; whether the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily

encountered the defendant's negligently created risk so as to bar the claim.
to the first issue, if

at fault.

comparative fault

If the court decides to

In the latter situation, the court

is

applied then the jury gets to decide

apply assumption of risk, the claim

may

is

With regard

who

is

more

barred altogether.

overlook whether one, or both, of the elements of

assumption of risk (knowing and voluntary) so as to prevent the case from going to the

22

Id., at

23

1092.

Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort

Law As

Corrective Justice:

A Pragmatic Justification For Jury

Adjudication, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2348 (1990). The article contains an excellent discussion of how rigid
principles of law (such as assumption of risk) hinder juries' attempts at corrective justice.

10

jury.

The example of the

sentient eight-year old diseussed

of those elements being imputed onto the boy

The same

pitfalls

apply

if

the plaintiff

encountering defendant's negligently created

The court again
any

fault

by the

will bar the claim. This

plaintiff bars recovery,

assumption of risk, the
consideration

is

is

an excellent example

to bar the claim.

is

deemed

to

have acquiesced to

risk despite lack

of an express agreement.

a problem because in contributory negligence

however

slight that

may

be.

In secondary

plaintiff is at fault for agreeing to encounter the risk, yet

given to whether the plaintiffs acquiescence

than, the defendant's fault

assumed

is

above

(remember

that plaintiffs behavior in

—

is

no

lesser, equal to, or greater

the defendant negligently created the risk).

agreement

is

It is

greater than the defendant's fault.

So, courts following comparative fault rules will allow the jury to consider an
action where both parties are at fault, yet summarily bar plaintiffs claim where plaintiff

waived any

has, through behavior alone,

right

of recovery.

Implied assumption of risk should be subsumed fully into comparative fault
principles.

Unless an express agreement

is

found between the plaintiff and the defendant

and the agreement doesn't stem from negligent behavior on either
not bar recovery where both parties act unreasonable and yet one
risks either not fully understood or with

in a negligent

behavior

law

is

manner

entails.

and

is

said to have

should

assumed

consequences greater than the assumption of risk

Finding assumption of risk based on an implication from

a factual determination; to have the court

results in confusing

part, the courts

difficult to reconcile

make

this

assessment as a matter of

outcomes. The maxim, "volunti nonfit

II

injuria, "

should only apply to an express agreement of willingness, not on behavior

alone.

Part

of this

II

article discusses the

common

law background of assumption of

and

how

also

examines the background of assumption of risk and

it fits

into the

scheme of negligence principles

as an affirmative defense. Part

(erosion?) with contributory negligence principles. Part

been redefined and narrowed

risk has

gained favor.

It

risk

parallels

III

in its application as

looks

its

at

development

how

comparative

includes an examination of statutory erosion and in

II

assumption of

fault principles

modern judicial

activism.

Next, Part IV examines

how assumption of risk,

conflicts with comparative fault

and

its

particularly the secondary form,

underlying policy reasons. This examination will

include the tension between applying secondary assumption of risk and comparative fault
principles to a negligence suit.

Part

V

comprises the bulk of this

article.

It

details a proposal for eliminating

secondary assumption of risk and proposes a comparative responsibility analysis to
resolve suits where each party

was deemed negligent and one assumed

other's act or omission. This proposal

in other areas

of the

common

is

based on

law. Finally, Part

VI

the risks of the

risk-utility principles

will

widely accepted

examine some criticisms of this

proposed analysis.

24

A commonly

used Latin

maxim meaning, "To

65 A C.J.S. Negligence § 174(1) (1966).

the willing, no

harm can be done."

See, generally,

PART
Assumption of the

Background of Assumption of Risk

II

risk historically

was used

to balance the desire to protect

defendants from shifting risks onto unwilling plaintiffs with the need to protect plaintiffs

from forcing defendants

to bear the costs

Developed as

common

part of the

of risks that were voluntarily assumed.

law of England

and carried over

to the

25

United States

court system^ the doctrine of assumption of risk had particular vitality in jurisdictions

'

26

Dean Wade, The Place ofAssumption of the Risk

Priestly v. Fowler, 3

M&W

The court found

related to the

that,

v.

fell

upon him.

of Negligence, 22 La.L.Rev.

A

that

5 (1961).

worker was injured by the negligence

In suing his

employer, he was denied

by accepting employment, he had assumed the

working conditions

See also Cruden

Law

150 Eng.Rep. 1030 (1837).

1,

of a fellow worker when an overloaded vehicle
recovery.

in the

risk

of his injuries

he could discover for himself.

Fentham, 2 Esp. 685, 170 Eng. Rep. 496 (1799).

A

seminal case

regarding the creation of the doctrine of contributory negligence which eventually led to the corollary
principle of assumption of risk

was

Butterfield v. Forrester,

1 1

East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927 (K.B.

1809).

The English Law Reform Act of 1945 replaced
Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945,

8

&

the rule with that of apportionment.

9 Geo. VI,

application of a even narrower theory of assumption of risk

order to waive a tort claim. See G. Williams, JOINT

308 (1951). They also argue
reflects

11

that the

consent to bearing the legal,

See, for example,

Hoffman

v.

except as

it

28. British scholars argue for the

whereby express consent

is

required in

TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 307-

assumption of risk defense should be rarely invoked because
in

Jones,

declared that the general English

c.

Law

it

addition to the physical, risks. Id.

280 So. 2d 43

common and

1

(Fla. 1973),

statutory

law was

12

the Florida

in full force

contradicted federal and state law. See also Johnson v.

Am.Dec. 375. 20 N.Y. 65(1859).

where

Supreme Court

and effect

in Florida

Hudson River R.R.Co., 75

13

that

followed contributory negligence principles.

Its

use was favored in the prevention of
jo

master-servant

liability suits.

In Tiller

v.

Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,

the Court

discussed the reason for the widespread use of this doctrine as seen in the context of the
Industrial Revolution

29
:

[Assumption of

risk]

can best be seen against the background of one

hundred years of master-servant

which was developed

judicially created rule

impulse of

common law

the employer as

which

much

Assumption of

in

risk is a

response to the general

courts at the beginning of this period to insulate
as possible

from bearing the 'human overhead'

an inevitable part of the cost-to someone-of the doing of

is

industrialized business.

the

tort doctrine.

common

law seems

expanding industry.
attributed

by

The general purpose behind

this

to

have been to give

The assumption of

this

development

maximum freedom

risk doctrine for

in

to

example was

Court to "a rule of public policy, inasmuch as an

opposite doctrine would not only subject employers to considerable and
often

ruinous

business[.]"

28

29

318 U.S. 54, 63

During

this

responsibilities,

thereby

embarrassing

all

branches

S.Ct.

444 (1943).

time period England began to recognize that the doctrine was rooted

free transferability

of

30

in the

notion of

of employment that was more concept than reality and thus decided to no longer

apply the doctrine. See, for example, Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 Harv. L. Rev. 14,

14-15(1907).

30

318 U.S. 54, 58-60.

at

14

Subsequently, the doctrine had been abolished by statutory
regard to cases involving federal workers' compensation.

continued
that state

its

31

Ironically,

assumption of risk

growth as part of the general body of tort law during the same time period

and federal laws under worker's compensation

assumption of risk

Even

amendment with

in the context

abrogated recognition of

of the master-servant relationship.

prior to the Congressional

Supreme Court recognized

statutes

amendment

that the distinction

was "hazy" and expressed concern

that abolished

assumption of risk, the

between assumption of risk and negligence

that "the servant's rights will be sacrificed

by simply

charging him with assumption of the risk under another name."

A. Elements of assumption of risk

The elements of assumption of risk

consist of the following: Actual

knowledge of

the danger; appreciation or understanding of the risk, and; voluntary exposure to that risk.

harm associated with

Additionally, the

the

outcome of the encounter must be within the

scope of the risk assumed.
Actual knowledge of the danger can range from encountering a risk that
obviously

31

known

to the plaintiff to a

defendant warning of a

risk, yet the plaintiff

Federal Employers' Liability Act, 53 Stat. 1404, 45 U.S.C. §54, 45 U.S.C.A. §54, as

1939.

32

33

34

Harper

&

F.

Schlemmer

v.

Buffalo, R.,

2

F.

James,

THE LAW OF TORTS §2

etc., R., Co.,

471 S.E.2d866. See supra note 13.

1

205 U.S.

.4

1,

(

1

is

956).

12-13, 27 S.Ct. 407,

409 (1907).

amended

in

15

deciding to encounter

it

anyway.

encountered a danger that

is

35

When

it

comes

to the

question of whether the plaintiff

so obvious such that she should be aware of

it, it is

mainly a

determination for the jury to decide whether the "obviousness" was high enough to

warrant that the plaintiff assumed a

risk.

The element of appreciation of the

risk, in its application,

defense or create such a high hurdle for plaintiffs to clear that

completely negating

liability for the

6

may make

See, for example, Toley v. Kansas City

(1992). Employees of the

parked vehicles

proof of any appreciation almost

Conversely, finding that the plaintiff was aware that

risk exists will almost completely diminish liability

35

tantamount to

is

it

Power

some

on the defendant's

In affirming denial

(indeed, any)
37

part.

& Light Company, 252 Kan. 205,

power company's coal generation

at the plant site.

vitiate the

defendant. For example, requiring a precise level of

appreciation of risk on the plaintiffs part

impossible.

can either

843 P.2d 248

plant sued for acid rain

of recovery by the

trial

damage

to their

court, the court noted that

the employer had posted a sign saying, in part, "parking your motor vehicles at or near the plant site
at

your

own
The

risk [due to

sulphurous emissions]."

Id., at

is

216.

court went on to note that plaintiffs should have

known of the

risks

of acid rain damage

(even without a posted sign) because of the 'obviousness' of the damage.

56

See, for example, Olson v.

belt

A.W. Chesterton Company, 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D.

maintenance operator received damages for his

machinery when he climbed atop of the

The
into the
that,

plaintiff

machinery but did not think

and stuck

that there
it

was

his

was some

'that

'

arm.

arm

level

It

was

in the

short-term

some

conveyor

belt driven

high pulley.

dangerous. The plaintiffs expert witness testified
it

was

stored in his long-term

the attempted repair, the expert testified, the plaintiff

was

in a state

memory where such

an appreciation of the risk

James Mansfield, Informed Choice

that requiring

lost in

A

of risk involved with sticking his arm

while the plaintiff was aware of the potential risk of his actions,

memory. During

37

acknowledged

belt

lost left

1977).

knowledge of the exact

in the

level

Law of Torts,

may

not have been stored.

of relying on his
Id., at

538.

22 La.L.Rev. 17 (1961). The author notes

of risk would demand an "exact prevision of the future that

16

The

on the plaintiffs
involve a

exposure

third element, voluntary

"The

risk.

risk] is a free

part in deciding

plaintiff

is

on complete acquiescence

on proceeding with a certain course of action

barred from recovery only

and voluntary one."

Finally, the

to the risk relies

3

Coercion or duress negate

*

harm must be within

this

A

are a result of encountering a risk that could

injury of type B.

It

[to

element.

may

incur the

39

the scope of the risk assumed. This is a general

damages

principle that prevents a defendant from claiming that plaintiffs

injury of type

choice

if [her]

that

resulting from

have only produced an

can also be stated as the element that prevents a causal chain of

events from becoming so long and twisted that the ultimate injury resulting from a risk

assumed
B.

is tentatively, at best,

Forms

related to the actual risk assumed.

of assumption of risk

Assumption of risk comes

40

41

in

two major forms

42
:

Express and implied. In the

implied form there are two additional subsets of assumption of risk: Primary and

would displace any notion of risk." Hence, requiring knowledge of any
assumption of risk cases being resolved

38

59

Keeton, et

al.,

Prosser and Keeton

See, for example, Marshall v. Ranne, 51

possible attack by a
his car to return

known

home.

41

42

See supra note

See supra note

2.

in

who

On The Law Of Torts,

1

in

raises the defense.

§

68

S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1974).

A

at

490

th

(5

ed.

1

984).

farmer, facing the prospect of

he went to his car, he was bitten on the hand. The court held, "The

was forced upon him

13.

Refer to the chart

favor of the defendant

of risk would result

vicious boar, could have remained in a farmhouse or gone outside to get in

When

latter alternative [choice]

40

in

level

Appendix A.

against his will[.]"

Id., at

259.

17

secondary,

43

with secondary implied assumption of risk having two additional subsets,

reasonable and unreasonable, depending on the plaintiffs behavior

is

time an injury

incurred.

The express and primary implied
44

contract.

In this theory, a prior

defendant.

categorizations are best considered as a form of

agreement of release from

sustained during the agreed upon activity

43

at the

is

liability for

damages

entered into between the plaintiff and the

The consequences of this agreement

are such that the risk

of negligence

The

See, for example, Minnesota's adoption of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.

shifts

statute says in

relevant part:
"Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless

toward the person or property of the actor or others, or
tort liability.

The term

risk not constituting

that subject a

person to

strict

also includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption of

an express consent or primary assumption of

risk,

misuse of a

product and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages, and the
defense of complicity under section 340A.801. Legal requirements of causal relation

apply both to fault as the basis for
last clear

chance

is

liability

and

to contributory fault.

The

doctrine of

abolished.

M.S.A. §604.01

In

adopting the principle of comparative

fault,

Minnesota created a two-prong definition of

assumption of risk: Primary and unreasonable, or secondary. See also, Springrose

v.

Wilmore, 292

Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971).

44

John L. Diamond, Assumption of risk after comparative negligence: Integrating Contract Theory

into Tort Doctrine,

contract theory

is

52 Ohio

St. L. J.

717. This theory of construing primary assumption of risk as a

supported by Whalen

v.

BMW of North America, Inc., 864 F.Supp.

131 (S.D. Cal

1994), where the court held that assumption of risk, although not ordinarily available in admiralty
cases, could be applied in this action because a contract to

do so

existed.

18

from the defendant

45

to the plaintiff.

of use of reasonable care toward the

Defendant

is

deemed

relieved of the duty or burden

plaintiff.

In implied secondary assumption of risk, although no express agreement exists,

there exists a strong implication of prior assent because the plaintiff

and voluntarily encounters a

46

is

fully cognizant

The consequences of this implication

risk.

of

are similar to

express assumption of risk, with plaintiffs actions having absolved defendant of any duty

owed toward him. Thus,
occurred by the

in seeking to

plaintiff, the

risk in a voluntary

manner.

These theories

prove that secondary assumption of risk has

defendant must prove that the plaintiff encountered a

known

47

are defeated

where public policy considerations outweigh these

types of agreements, contrary to libertarians

who would

hold that agreements are in most

Also, the express and primary implied agreements do not

circumstances enforceable.

give the defendant leeway to act in a gross, wanton or reckless

manner toward

the

plaintiff.

45

Prosser,

TORTS); 2

46

47

HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 439-441
F.

Harper

& F.

James,

THE LAW OF TORTS

§

1 1

68 (4th

62- 1

1

ed. 1981) (hereinafter referred to as

67 §2 1

Arthur Best, Comparative Negligence: Law and Practice

See, for example,

Vaughn

v.

Pleasant,

.

1

(

1

956).

(1993).

266 Ga. 862, 471 S.E.2d 866 (1996). The elements of

assumption of risk consist of the following: Actual knowledge of the danger; appreciation or
understanding of the

48

risk,

and; voluntary exposure to that risk.

Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive

among

libertarian thinkers that

Justice,

assumption of risk,

89 Yale

in its

Id., at

L.J.

864.

427 (1980). There

is

agreement

express form, should be never be abrogated

and indeed could be expanded beyond formal written contract principles.

19

In contrast, implied secondary assumption of risk with

and unreasonable

when

a plaintiff

theories,

is

"a thorn in the judicial side."

knowingly and voluntarily meets a

defendant and bars recovery by the

plaintiff.

to either

As

subsets of reasonable

stated above,

risk negligently created

50

In

its

application by courts,

of contributory negligence because

by the

to categorize the plaintiffs

fault

it is

very similar to the principles

on the plaintiffs part

is

factored into the court's

consideration of whether to allow plaintiff to recover damages.^

made

occurs

allow recovery or not, based on the plaintiffs reasonableness in

encountering the danger.

is

it

Furthermore, the two subsets, reasonable

and unreasonable secondary assumption of risk, attempt
conduct so as

49

its

In contrast,

no inquiry

into the defendant's behavior regarding the creation of the occurrence.

In the reasonable subcategory, the plaintiffs conduct in encountering the

negligently created risk by the defendant will not bar or reduce

fault jurisdictions.

49

Blackburn

50

E.

Todd

en
"

v. Dorta,

damages

in

comparative

.

But, if the plaintiff acted unreasonably, this

348 So. 2d 287, 291

Presnell, Torts

—Perez

v.

is

determined

to

be

(Fla. 1977).

McConkey: The Tennessee Supreme Court Abolishes Implied

Assumption of Risk After the Adoption of Comparative Fault

in Mclntyre,

25 U. Mem. L. Rev. 291

(1994).

51

In fact, Prosser

negligence

is

acquiescence

once pointed out that the difference between assumption of risk and contributory

where "assumption of risk
in

it,

is

a matter of knowledge of the danger and intelligent

while contributory negligence

is

a matter of some fault or departure from the

standard of reasonable conduct, however unwilling or protesting the plaintiff may be." Robert

v.

King, 253 N.C. 571, 117 S.E.2d 421 (1960). Apparently Prosser was discussing assumption of risk
before the

many

subsets and variations

elements of fault on the plaintiffs

part,

came about

much

as secondary assumption of risk carries with

like the principles

of contributory negligence.

it

the

20

unreasonable secondary assumption of

risk

and the

plaintiff will

have his damages either

barred completely or reduced according to the jury's apportionment of fault attributed to
53

the plaintiff.

Some

adopting comparative fault principles, have abrogated the use of

states, in

implied assumption of risk.

54

C. Secondary assumption of risk retains viability despite disappearance of

contributory negligence

Ever since the Mississippi

legislature enacted a statute in

1910 eliminating the use

of contributory negligence and giving comparative negligence principles
into the courts of

America,

53

more than

forty five other states

foray

its first

and the District of

52

Id.

>3

See, generally. Spell,

Stemming

the Tide of Expanding Liability:

The Coexistence of Comparative

Negligence and Assumption of Risk, 64 Miss. L.J. 753 (1988). In "pure" comparative
jurisdictions, the plaintiff

defendant so long he

is

always recovers damages even

not 100 percent at fault.

if

he

is

found to be more

The damages recovered

fault

at fault

than the

are equal to the percentage of

the defendant's fault.
In

"modified" comparative

fault is not greater than

comparative

fault jurisdictions, the plaintiff will

recover damages only

if his

50 percent. Twenty jurisdictions have a "not greater than" modified

fault statute

where a "50/50

greater than" jurisdictions,

if plaintiff is

split"

of damages

is

possible.

permitted recovery, she

is

In both

"modified" and "not

awarded damages

in the

percentage

attributable to the defendant's fault.

5

E.

Todd

Presnell, Torts

—Perez

v.

McConkey: The Tennessee Supreme Court Abolishes Implied

Assumption of Risk After the Adoption of Comparative Fault
(1994).

in

Mclntyre, 25 U.

Mem.

L. Rev. 291

21

Columbia have enacted

Comparative

similar measures of their own.

fault principles

have predominated over contributory negligence principles because the end result

viewed as more

the cost of litigation

equitable,

is

spread over a broader group of

is

persons (and thus subsuming individual costs), and a plaintiff avoids having his cause of
action being completely barred from recovery however slight his

own

fault

may

be.

However, the theory of assumption of risk, whose own history neatly meshes with
the principles of contributory negligence and reached popularity through

now outmoded

CO

master-servant doctrines,"

still

risk has taken

on

different lives

the juries that

sit

in them.

55

Act of Apr.

(1972).

relationships.

In

and meanings, much

1910 Miss. Laws 125

Some commentators have
when

to this day.

its

present form, assumption of

to the

confusion of the courts and

59

16, 1910, ch. 135,

risk four years later

on

lives

(later

amended

suggested that Mississippi did

as Miss.

in fact

was

do away with assumption of

the legislature passed a law eliminating the defense in

Since this was only the type of tort that used this defense

the legislative intent

to

employer-employee

at the time,

completely abrogate assumption of risk, not just limit

— Time for a Change?, 44 Miss. L.

Wilder, Assumption of Risk in Mississippi

56

Code Ann. S 11-7-15

Jim Hasenfus, The Role of Recklessness

in

J.

it

its

is

argued that

application. See

452 (1973).

American Systems of Comparative

Fault, 43

Ohio

St. L.J.

399(1982).

57

In Louisville

award

Nashville R. Co. v Fisher, 357 S.W.2d 683 (Ky. 1962), the court, in reversing an

for the plaintiff

able to see through

a

58

more just

result

Spell,

overgrown weeds

at

a crossing barred recovery.

would have been achieved

Tiller v. Atlantic

59

and ruling for the defendant railroad, held that the plaintiffs

Stemming

if

it

were able

to apply

fault in not

being

The court admitted however
comparative negligence

that

rules.

Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63 S.Ct. 444 (1943).

the Tide

of Expanding

Liability:

The Coexistence of Comparative Negligence and

Assumption of Risk, 64 Miss. L.J. 753 (1988); Rosenlund

&

Killion,

Once a Wicked Sister: The

22

Conceptual differences between assumption of risk and contributory negligence
are three-fold: First, assumption of risk deals with

acquiescence

in

it,

but contributory negligence

is

knowledge of the danger and voluntary

simply a departure from the standard of

reasonable care (in an unknowing and unsuspecting manner); second, due to these
different behaviors, assumption of risk

plaintiff actually

know

at the

is

viewed as a subjective standard (what did the

time of the injury) while contributory negligence

on an objective "reasonable person" standard;

third,

assumption of risk

relies

is

based

on a

presuming adventurousness on the plaintiffs part while contributory negligence

relies

upon reasonableness.
Attempts have been made

to distinguish these

example, in Tennessee, assumption of risk

is

conceptual differences. For

based on consent (whether expressed or

Continuing Role ofAssumption of Risk Under Comparative Fault

in California,

20 U.S.F.L.Rev. 225

(1986).

Indeed, Justice Frankfurter once stated: "[T]he phrase 'assumption of risk'
illustration

of the extent

to

which

uncritical use of

A

words bedevils the law.

literary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition;

is

an excellent

phrase begins

and repetition soon establishing

it

life

as a

as a legal

formula, indiscriminately used to express different and sometimes contradictory ideas." 318 U.S. 54,

68 (1943). Frankfurter concurring opinion. See also generally, Note, Symposium: Assumption of Risk,
22 La.

L.

Rev.

1

(1961).

For an amusing analogy of assumption of risk with a mysterious element called "phlogiston,"
see

Wex

S.

Malone, Foreword— The Kid

Who Got Left

an imaginary element believed to be responsible for

Out, 22 La.L.Rev.

fire;

once

it

1

(1961). Phlogiston

was discovered

that

it

never existed,

meaningful analysis of the causation of fire was undertaken.

60

See Riley

v.

Davidson Construction Co., 381 Mass. 432, 409 N.E.2d 1279 (1980); Blum

Brichacek, 191 Neb. 457, 215

N.W.2d 888

(1974).

was

v.

23

implied) and the ''keystone" to this consent

is

knowledge.

based on the issue of whether a reasonably prudent
the danger and avoided

acknowledge

As

that the

it.

same

However,

in

facts in a case

61

Contributory negligence

man would

is

or should have discovered

attempting to delineate the differences, courts

may

contributory negligence waned,

64

be relevant to both defenses.

63

the principal of secondary (implied)

assumption of risk remained. This did not occur without tension from the courts and

Many

commentators.

courts, while recognizing that

labeling

wrongdoing on the plaintiffs

damages among
In Li

v.

the parties.

Yellow

Cab

3

Mclntyre

v. Ballantine,

63

64

Vaughn

Co.,

66

the California court pronounced that comparative fault

all its

subsidiary forms were also no longer

833 S.W. 2d 52 (Tenn. 1992).

v. Pleasant,

same elements

many

other states.

supra notes 12 and 44.

a complete defense, contributory negligence has disappeared in England, continental Europe,

Canada,

New

Zealand, Western Australia and forty-six states of America. See

Annotation, Comment Note — The Doctrine of Comparative Negligence and

Doctrine of Contributory Negligence, 32

65

as

Supra note 56.

As

Matthew

J.

A.L.RJd

its

Howard

J.

Alperin,

Relation to the

463, 469 (1970) (1999 supplement).

Toddy, Assumption of Risk Merged with Contributory Negligence: Anderson

Ceccardi, 45 Ohio

by

This merger however creates the confusion.

Supra, note 53. Tennessee defines assumption of risk with the

See, for example,

fault

part as contributory negligence in apportioning

replaced contributory negligence; thus,

62

a doctrine

is

evolved from contributory negligence, merged the doctrine with comparative

that

61

assumption of the risk

St. L. J.

1059 (1984).

v.

24

As

recognized.

by the defense
action.

6

such, assumption of the risk could only be introduced at

to ameliorate

damages, not

in

trial in

attempt

an attempt to seek a total bar to the cause of

Unfortunately, this clear statement with regard to assumption of the risk has not

been picked up on by other jurisdictions.
In Knight

v.

Jewett,

6

*

and

in

Anderson

v.

Ceccardi,

cases

which attempted

to

resolve this conflict, the courts simply decided to have the knowledge element of

assumption of the

risk

known

encountering a

be the determinative factor in deciding whether a plaintiff
risk

can recover.

Anderson reached a somewhat contradictory

conclusion: Comparative fault had replaced contributory negligence yet the court had

this to

say about assumption of risk:

[C]onduct previously considered assumption of the risk by the plaintiff
be considered by the

shall

trier

of

fact

under the phrase 'contributory

negligence of the person bringing the action'

66

67

[in the

present suit].

71

13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975).

The Court

stated:

"The defense of assumption of the

risk

is

also abolished to the extent that

merely a variant of the former doctrine of contributory negligence; assumption of the risk

subsumed under
68

69

70

3 Cal.

4

6 Ohio

[Tjhere

a risk of

th

St.

is

3d

1

10,

no merit

harm

that

451 N.E.2d 780 (1983).

to the... general

may

arise

claim that simply because a person

St.

is

aware an

from another's negligence and voluntarily proceeds

activity involves

to participate in that

such knowledge, that person should be barred from obtaining any recovery on the

(1992). Note that the defendant prevailed

Ohio

be

the general process of assessing liability in proportion to negligence." Id.

theory that he or she impliedly consented to the risk of harm. 3 Cal. 4

6

to

is

296, 834 P.2d 696 (1992).

activity despite

71

is

it

anyway on

3d 110, 451 N.E.2d 780 (1983).

th

296, 312, 834 P.2d 696, 706

the theory of assumption of risk.

25

In

sum,

in those courts that

have not followed the clarity of Yellow Cab, the only

true distinction separating assumption of risk from contributory negligence

is

merely the

scrutiny of whether a subjective inquiry (of plaintiff s awareness or knowledge) should

be used versus an objective inquiry (reasonable person standard).
subjective standard remains and

72

The

significant difference

is

is

Consequently, the

applied in a very subjective manner.

likely to be

one between the

risks in fact

known

to the plaintiff

and

those risks which he should have discovered through the exercise of ordinary care. Prosser, TORTS,

441 §68. Plainly, this

is

a subjective versus objective inquiry.

PART III
The

A.

The

Rise of Comparative Fault and the Erosion of Assumption of Risk

introduction of comparative fault

Comparative

fault

gained favor in recent decades because of

its

underlying

notions of fairness and ease of application for the jury system (although

favored in those
slight fault

plaintiff

on

civil

his

code jurisdictions that do not use juries).

own was

often, a plaintiffs

plead as contributory negligence by the defendant and the

was barred from any recovery, however

was viewed

Too

was

initially

it

as injustice because, as

it

slight that fault

has been said, "the injured

for the very reason of his injury, the less able of the

two

may have

man

been. This

is in all probability,

to bear the financial

burden of

his loss[.]"

To ameliorate

this effect, especially in suits

involving employees attempting

form of recompensation from the employer for an injury incurred while on the job,

3

state

and the federal government began enacting statutes to implement comparative

legislators

'

some

For example,

in

Germany

a

Supreme Court decision overruled previous decisions

that

allowed an

"all-or-nothing" approach where contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff could be plead.

The

court favored a

statute that

more

flexible approach; in their decision they returned to the original intent

implemented comparative

fault type

of negligence

suits.

BGHZ 34,

355 (363) (Supreme

Court of Germany).

The
If

to

relevant code section provides:

any

fault

of the injured party has contributed to causing the damage, the obligation

compensate the injured party and the extent of the compensation

depends upon the circumstances!.]
§

74

Prosser,

254

BGB

(F.R.G.) (German Civil Code).

TORTS, 433 §67.

26

of the

to be

made

27
fault principles.

For example, the Federal Employer Liability Act (FELA),

using the language of "contributory negligence,"
6

the statute have the effect of comparative fault.

compensation
upholding

75

statutes following

structured in such a

is

Many

states

75

way

while

still

so as to have

adopted workers'

implementation of FELA and Supreme Court decisions

their validity to reach this result in a similar

Federal Employers' Liability Act, 53

An

manner.

attempt

1404. 45 U.S.C. §54, 45 U.S.C.A. §54, as

Stat.

to

broaden

amended

in

1939.

76

In

1939 Congress specifically amended the Act

to eliminate the use

of assumption of risk. See,

supra note 71.

77

Alperin, "Doctrine of Contributory Negligence...," 32 A.L.R. 3d 463 (1970).

See also Philip D. Oliver, Once

Enough: A Proposed Bar of the Injured Employee

is

Cause ofAction Against A Third Party, 58 Fordham
historical

background of workers' compensation

In

L. Rev.

statutes,

1

17 (1989). In his discussion of the

he notes:

1904, Massachusetts established a commission on employer

liability in

response to

increasing industrial injuries and restrictive tort remedies, the publication of a

account of the German system of
the

first

British

strict liability for

Compensation Act

in

's

full

employers, and the enactment of

1897. Other states followed Massachusetts'

lead.
* * *

In

1910, representatives of commissions from Congress and nine states drafted a

Uniform

Workmen's

Compensation

unconstitutional. In the

Appeals held

Some

Law.

early

most important of these decisions, the

that a provision

for

damages

in

statutes

were

New York

held

Court of

the absence of fault constituted

deprivation of property without due process of law, in violation of the state and
federal constitutions.

(1911).

See Ives

v.

Any problem posed by

amendment. See 4 N.Y. Laws
constitution by adding

art.

I,

decisions by the United States

South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431

the

New York

app., at
§

19

Constitution

was met by a 1913

2492 (1913) (amending

(now

§

18)).

New York

state

Shortly thereafter, a series of

Supreme Court resolved

the federal constitutional

28
the effect of comparative fault by the

American Law

application of secondary assumption of the risk

developments have occurred rather rapidly

was

in the

Institute to

weakening the

similarly undertaken.

78

All of these

span of the past few decades, building
70

on the federal

legislative activity at the turn

of the century.

Also, courts attempted to use the doctrine of last clear chance to keep defendants

from avoiding the costs of the

more confusion however

injuries resulting

O

still

This result

is

most

a result,

being restated in a variety of different

likely

viewed as a concept separate from comparative

by upholding workers' compensation

because assumption of risk was

fault

and thus not readily replaced by

statutes. See, e.g.,

Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 37 S.Ct. 260 (1917); Hawkins

v.

As

1

constructions.

issue

This caused even

their actions.

as the courts had difficulty in applying this concept.

the doctrine has been declining in favor while

ways and

from

210, 37 S.Ct. 255 (1917);

New York

R.R.

v.

Mountain Timber Co.
v.

Bleakly, 243 U.S.

White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 S.Ct. 247

(1917).
* * *

By
to

1920,

19

but eight states had compensation acts. Hawaii

adopt the system

Id., at

78

all

became

the fiftieth state

in 1963.

118 and footnote 24.

See the Model Comparative Fault

See, supra note 3

Statute, infra note 152.

1

Maclntyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1225 (1940). See also Ackerman
v.

James, 200

N.W.2d 818 (Iowa

1972),

which has a discussion of different cases

doctrine.

81

James, Last Clear Chance:

A

Transitional Doctrine, 47 Yale L.J. 704 (1938).

that use this

29

those statutes implementing eomparative

assumption

fault.

Even with some courts subsuming

oi risk into comparative fault confusion

During

this period

still

exists.

of mitigating the harsh results of contributory negligence and

narrowing the aspects of its corollary contributions, assumption of risk began

As discussed above,

this erosion

occurred

worker's compensation and other

state

in several different areas:

and federal employment

and,

most

decline.

the adoption of

statutes, the use

clear chance, an inquiry into whether the elements of assumption of risk

present during the cause of action in question

its

of last

were ever

significantly, with the

increasing adoption of comparative fault.

Comparative
critics

fault has its roots in the theory

of contributory negligence and

assumption of risk,

et al.)

way of replacing what

its

of apportionment of damages.

correlating doctrines (last clear chance,

looked to the examples in use by

civil

code jurisdictions as a

they saw as a complicated and unfair doctrine.

Implement apportionment of damages, the so-called comparative
Critics

of this system wasted

Many

little

time in responding.

84

The suggestion:

fault system.

A principle criticism

stems from the philosophy that underscored the idea behind contributory negligence:

Comparative

82

S3

84

r

•

Li

v.

Yellow

fault reduces the

Cab

Co., 13 Cal.

promotion of caution by the

plaintiff

3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975).

See, supra note 64.

Comparative Negligence Symposium, 23

Mem.

St.

U.L.Rev. (1992).

who

should be

30

responsible tor his

of juries,

°

who

action they

safety.

Another critieism of comparative negligence

viewed by some as willing

are

sit in

come under

own

'

to

award damages

on. Furthermore, such deliberations, as

fire as

the jury

is

viewed as ill-equipped

to

for every cause

viewed by these same

make

distrust

is

of

critics,

the right decisions.

87

B. Rethinking the corollary contributions of contributory negligence

With the adoption of comparative

fault courts

have re-examined two corollaries of

contributory negligence: assumption of risk and the "last clear chance."*
clear chance doctrine (wherein a plaintiff may

defendant had a

final

ceased to recognize

3d

One

still

8

With the

recover despite his negligence

last

if

the

opportunity to avoid occurrence of the injury) the courts have
application.

its

study suggests that this

may

This

is

mainly due to the

not be true. See

fact that the doctrine

was

Mole and Wilson, A Study of Comparative

Negligence, 17 Corn. L. Q. 333, 344 (1933).

6

David W. Robertson, Ruminations on Comparative Fault, Duty-Risk Analysis, Affirmative Defenses,

and Affirmative Doctrines

7

Id., at

in

Negligence and Strict Liability

1395. Mistrust of juries

is

also discussed in

Wex

S.

in

Louisiana, 44 La. L. Rev. 1341 (1982).

Malone, Comparative Negligence

—

Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 La. L. Rev. 125, 144 (1945). Yet compare this perception against
the jury's findings in Harris v. Hercules Incorporated and the court's subsequent action on the verdict,

supra note

iS

7.

Although some courts have applied the new comparative

issues of assumption of risk, res ipsa loquitor

Communicating Between

the Planets:

and

last clear

Law Reform for

Rev. 169(1998).

89

Bokhoven

v.

Klinker, 474

N.W.2d 553 (Iowa

1991).

fault standards without addressing the

chance. See, generally, Dominick Vetri,

the Twenty-First Century, 34 Willamette L.

31

seen as a possible method of ameliorating the harsh "all or nothing" rule of contributory
negligence. With the decline of contributory negligence so too goes last clear chance.

Not

so with secondary assumption of risk;

90

has remained and courts have been

it

struggling to merge this doctrine into comparative fault. That this problem exists today

remarkable

in light

abolishment,

fact that

of the

fact that the

at least in part,

Uniform Comparative Fault Act called

of assumption of risk.

91

Part of the

is

for the

problem stems from the

secondary assumption of risk and contributory negligence, despite some

differences, overlap. Both doctrines look to the plaintiffs behavior to determine whether

it

played a role in causing his

between the

risks in fact

own

known

injury.

"

The

to the plaintiff

and those

discovered through the exercise of ordinary care.

where the

?0

final analysis

Of course,

significant difference

93

This

risks

is

F.Supp. 96 (S.D. Ga. 1974), where the Georgia courts

still

likely to be

one

which he should have

contrary to last clear chance

was centered on defendant's behavior before

there are always exceptions. See Southern Railway v.

is

plaintiff was

Brunswick Pulp

adhere to the

last clear

& Paper Co.,

376

chance doctrine as

an affirmative defense.

91

A

model

statute, the

Uniform Comparative Fault Act §l(b) (1977),

to preclude recovery, including

states that certain defenses

used

"unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable

express consent," would only reduce damages in the amount apportioned to plaintiffs

fault.

See,

infra note 152.

92

[In a case

where the

plaintiff

of contributory negligence,
voluntarily encountering a

in

is

deemed

to

have acted

in a negligent

which the negligence consists

known unreasonable

risk.

in

manner] his conduct

making

In such cases

it

is

the

93

Id., at

§68.

440-442.

a form

wrong choice and

clear that the defenses of

assumption of risk and contributory negligence overlap, and are as intersecting

TORTS 441

is

circles... [.]"

Prosser,

,

32

As

injured.

the plaintiff

stated earlier, both plaintiff and defendant share

is

determined to be

his suit is barred

Thus

it

at fault in

a

some degree of fault but

manner deemed permissive

94

on

if

his part, then

from recovery.

makes sense

assumption of risk

that

into primary

some

courts have narrowed the application of

and express variations only. With these two theories,

plaintiff is expressly or implicitly agreeing to relieve defendant of his duty of care

without acting in a negligent manner in doing so (refer to chart

at

end of article). Some

courts have gone even further and abolished assumption of risk completely as a defense,

holding that the similarities between assumption of risk and the outmoded contributory
negligence principles are so intertwined that statutory elimination of contributory
negligence does away with assumption of risk as well.

narrowing of assumption of risk has occurred on the

Statutorily, this abrogation or

federal

and

state level.

For example, the Federal Employer Liability Act (FELA)

modifies the doctrine of contributory negligence

94

95

5

97

to effectively function as

Again, refer to the different types of permissive behavior possible by

Cutties

v. Hill

Wacker, 217

Top Developers,

Ill.App.

Inc.,

14 Cal.App.4

3d 151, 576 N.E.2d

1

1

,h

13 (1991);

plaintiff,

comparative

supra note

1651. 18 Cal.Rptr. 2d 445 (1993);

Swagger

v.

Crystal,

379N.W.2d

96

97

th

700, 703 §2 (1982).

45U.S.C. §51 etseq.

45 U.S.C. §53

is

as follows:

Contributory negligence; diminution of damages

1.

Hanke

v.

183 (Minn.

1985). See, generally. Annotation, Effect of Adoption of Comparative Negligence Rules on

Assumption of Risk, 16 A.L.R. 4

96

33
no

negligence while eliminating assumption

oi'risk.

Merchant Marine Act and the Jones Act.

Other federal statutes include the

Putting these statutes together

means

that

insofar as the employer-employee relationship in the railroad industry goes comparative

negligence while secondary assumption of risk has been

fault has replaced contributory

completely abrogated. Congress has delineated a clear

In all actions hereafter

brought against any such

by virtue of any of the provisions of

damages

for personal injuries to

shall not bar a recovery,
to the

§§51

et seq.] to

recover
in

but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in

who may

attributable to such employee:

Provided,

be injured or killed shall be held to have been

guilty of contributory negligence in
carrier

USC

by railroad under or

an employee, or where such injuries have resulted

amount of negligence

That no such employee

carrier

employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence

his death, the fact that the

proportion

common

this act [45

of tracks in terms of what

set

any case where the violation by such

common

of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or

death of such employee (emphasis added).

In

made

it

Seabord A.L.Railway

v.

Horton, 239 U.S. 595, 36 S.Ct. 180 (1916), the Supreme Court

clear that contributory negligence

and assumption of risk are separate theories because

assumption of risk remained as a complete defense while contributory negligence did not. Congress

amended

98

this act in

1939 to eliminate assumption of risk.

45 U.S.C. §54. The relevant portion of this section

states:

[S]uch employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his employment in

any case where such injury or death resulted

in

whole or

in part

from the negligence

[of the railroad].

This section abrogates assumption of risk
railroads.

Congress added

acted in a

manner

this section to

to be considered

in

terms of the employment relationship

avoid any confusion over whether plaintiff

secondary assumption of risk since the court

Horton, supra, indicated that expressed assumption of risk

99

45 U.S.C. §688.

in

still is

a viable defense.

in

34

defenses are, and aren't, available. This statute has no applieation outside the railroad
industry and does not apply to the several states.

100

In federal maritime law, the advent of comparative fault has also resulted in the

narrowing of assumption of risk

Courts have refused to consider the defense

principles.

except in circumstances where an express contract so exists.

Whalen

BMW of North American,

v.

in federal

assumption of risk

(as

it

Toleda, St.L.&W.R.Co.

I.R.Co, 292 N.Y. 448, 50

101

Barber

v.

Marina

is

subsumed

v. Slavin,

NYS

As
is

fault but

the court stated in

ordinarily not available

because a contractual

will be applied to bar plaintiffs claim.

an express contract)

secondary assumption of risk

100

assumption of risk

Inc.

maritime law under principles of comparative

clause to the effect existed,

101

still

into

103

Primary

has application then in this arena but

comparative

236 U.S. 454, 35

S. Ct.

fault.

306 (1915); see also Sadowski

v.

Long

2d 171 (1944).

Sailing, Inc.,

36 Cal. App. 4

,h

558, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 697 (1995).

The

court relied

on 28 U.S.C. §1333(1).
Interestingly, this
this

common

is

a result of following English

common

law

in admiralty cases.

law approach gave American courts contributory negligence

in all other

Following

genre of cases.

See generally, Anne M. Payne, Annotation, Historical Development, 2 Am.Jur. 2d, Admiralty §2
(1994).

102

864 F.Supp. 131 (S.D. Cal. 1994).

103

Id.

The clause was

racing contest.

The

part

of a form signed by the plaintiff John Whalen prior to his injury

clause, in pertinent part, states, "I

participation in the race, failure or breakage of

conditions."

Id., at

132.

my

assume any

risks

yacht, or any of

its

of injury arising out

in

a yacht

of:

equipment, or weather

my

35

As

narrowing or erosion of assumption of risk

for the

have been achieved mostly through

results

activism.

in the states, different

a combination of state legislation

and judicial

Eight states have abolished the assumption of risk defense in the absence of an
104

express agreement

,

twenty-seven states have retained the defense as a factor

determining respective

105

fault

,

and

fifteen states

and the District of Columbia keep

assumption of risk as a defense regardless of whether primary or secondary

by the defense.

106

Of these

latter fifteen,

in

three states and

DC

still

is

established

adhere to the principles

of contributory negligence (and thus have some valid relationship between the overlap of
1

secondary assumption of risk and contributory negligence).
Further compounding this issue,

some of those

contributory negligence in favor of comparative fault

104

57B Am.

Jur.

2D

Negligence

§

07

states that

still

have abolished

maintain that secondary

1300-1751 (1989). Those states are Connecticut,

Illinois,

Kansas.

Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, North Dakota and Oregon.

105

Id.

Those

states are Alaska, Arizona,

Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,

Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Jersey,

106

Id.

New

New

Mexico,

Those

states are

Carolina, Oklahoma,

107

still

Island, South Carolina,

New

DC. Furthermore, of these

South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, West
states,

Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina and

of contributory negligence.

Gail D. Hollister, Using Comparative Fault to Replace the All

Intentional Tort Suits in

123 n.2 (1993).

Hampshire,

York, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming.

Rhode

retain the use

New

Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, North

Virginia, Pennsylvania,

DC

Nevada,

Which Both the

Plaintiff and

Or Nothing Lottery Imposed in

Defendant Are At Fault, 46 Vand.

L. Rev.

121,

36

assumption of risk,
principally relied

in

both

upon

apportioning fault

is

forms,

its

is still

in these courts for

consent by the

a complete bar to recovery.

10

The argument

*

denying recovery completely without
109

plaintiff.

C. Assumption of risk's elements of confusion
In those states

inconsistent manner.

may

still

applying secondary assumption of risk

The elements of assumption of risk

done

in

an

knowing and voluntary)

be defined, or ignored, so as to justify the outcome desired or the doctrine

overlooked altogether. Or, as demonstrated
the plaintiffs lead in choosing

law

(i.e.,

it is

that

it

it

in the

as the forum)

Decker

may

case,

'

may

be

the court (following

get lucky and be able to choose the

finds appropriate to the case at hand and skirt the issue altogether. Courts have

hesitated to find any assumption of risk as a matter of law in situations

outcome would have a harsh outcome

where the

(or alternatively apply the doctrine regardless

of its

harsh outcome) by overlooking the voluntary and knowing elements necessary for such a
defense. Also, courts have allowed the doctrine to upset or contravene a jury's finding;

may come from

such a result
principles

it

bases

its

a jury's confusion as to the implications behind the

findings on. At the very least, courts are aware of the possibility of

inequity through application of assumption of risk.

108

Riley

v.

Davidson Construction

191 Neb. 457,

110

111

381 Mass. 432

at

See supra note

17.

357

Mass. 432, 409 N.E.2d 1279 (1980); Blum

215 N.W.2d 888 (1974); Kennedy

A.2d 329 (1977).

109

Co., 381

S. W.2d

437 (1980).

683, supra note 55.

v.

Providence Hockey Club,

Inc.,

119

v.

Bhchacek,

R.I. 70.

376

37

An

examination of the consent portion of the assumption of risk equation can
i

reveal

some incongruous

v.

i

T

by using the

could have consented to the possibility of harm to herself. However, the court

went on
plaintiff.

The

to discuss a crucial fact:

stairs

were the only means of ingress/egress for the

Because of this lack of choice on her

part,

therefore did not consent to assuming the risk of

means of entry

into her apartment.

1

it

was found

that the plaintiff

harm from using

the only available

13

Consider also whether a shipper of cabbages was held
risk

was injured while using

a tenant

Briley,

In allowing her recovery, the court reasoned that the plaintiff,

the stairs.

stairs,

Conroy

In

results.

to

have not assumed the

of a defective car supplied by a carrier where the alternative was to leave the

cabbages rotting

in the field, thus destroying

part to realize profit from their sale.

The following two cases

Long Island R.R.

'

l3

1

14

are also illustrative. In the widely discussed Eckert

case, the plaintiffs

railroad track as a train bore

any possibility of utility on the shipper's

down on

v.

deceased was killed when rescuing a child on a

the child. At

trial,

the court refused to allow the

defendant's motion to insert a jury instruction with regard to whether a plaintiff

112

113

91

So.2d601 (Fla.App.1966).

The court

stated, in part. "[T]he tenant,

without any choice of a method of egress, did not assume

the risk of the danger created by the landlord." Id., at 603.

114

115

Missouri,

K&TR.

Co. of Texas

43 N.Y. 502(1871).

v.

McLean, 55 Tex.Civ.App.

130,

118S.W.

161 (1909).

38

voluntarily placed himself in harm's

way when

rescuing a child."

6

The Court of Appeals

affirmed, ignoring the issue of assumption of risk and hailing the actions of the plaintiffs

The

deceased.

dissent

was

correct

when

it

pointed out that the plaintiffs deceased had

voluntarily and knowingly encountered a risk, therefore precluding recovery by his
8

estate."

To avoid such an

inequitable result, the majority avoided the voluntary aspect

of assumption of risk altogether.
This case was distinguished by Wilson

some young
was

hit

children running next to a

moving

New

train,

York

in Eckert, the court

estate, stating that the context

voluntarily

moving

assumed the
train.

l9

]

where a brakemen, seeing

attempted to get them away.

from behind by a fence post as he leaned off the

motives were the same as

the

v.

rail

car and killed. Although his

denied a possibility of recovery by his

of his heroism was not the same and that he knowingly and

risk of

harm when he attempted

In neither case can the

to

keep the children away from

argument be made

that there

rescue as both of the deceased did not place the children in harm's
action (or inaction). For both, rescue

116

This particular outcome gave

117

Id.,

Allen,

J.

118

Id.

119

29

R.I. 146,

120

Id., at

368.

was voluntary

69 A. 364(1908).

was

a duty to

way through

only.

rise to the doctrine that ''danger invites rescue.

dissenting.

He

their

own

39
In Eckert, the court refused to apply assumption of risk as a corollary to the

defendant's assertion that the plaintiffs deceased acted

in a

contributory negligent

manner. In affirming, the Court of Appeals overlooked the issue and decided the merits
according to what they

felt

was

the equitable

outcome

to the

man's heroic actions.

In

Wilson, the court imputed the elements of assumption of risk onto the deceased's actions,

claiming that his death

is

directly the result of voluntarily placing

The Court of Appeals attempted

to distinguish the

himself in harm's way.

two rescue attempts by the

contact the rescuer had with the children: In the former case, the rescuer

physically carry the child away; in the

latter,

the rescuer could only rely

was

on

able to

powers of

his

persuasion to get the children out of harm's way. Apparently, Wilson got broad-sided by

more than just

a fence post.

This selective application of the elements of assumption of risk has expanded into
other decisions. Certainly,

assumption of risk
1

recovery.

many

courts have ignored the voluntary element of

in order to find that the

defense did not exist to bar the plaintiffs

For example, the plaintiff may have encountered a forced choice

encountering the risk and thus there

is

no voluntary action on his

part.

In choosing the

course of action that resulted in his injury, the choice was necessary because
result in a meritorious

happening here

121

is

outcome, such as saving a child's

Id.

Eckert.

that the courts are negating the "voluntary" aspect

Prosser, Torts 31 1-13

122

life in

th

(5

ed. 1955).

when

it

would

What

is

really

of assumption of

40
This results in assumption of the risk being

risk so as to allow the plaintiff to recover.

applied across the board to

all plaintiffs;

mean

alternatives doesn't necessarily

taking a course of action with a lack of true

consent.

This selective application of this

tort

doctrine not a uniquely

American

event.

In

continental European legal systems which use the broader term of "fault of the injured

party" rather than contributory negligence,

in

124

courts have been found to be very flexible

determining whether a plaintiff has assumed any risk or been

the defendant

is

more

at fault.

One commentator

at

any

fault in suits

where

notes in general with regard to civil law-

jurisdictions in Europe:

[I]t is difficult to

how

say

far the courts lean

to "discover" contributory fault [or

the victim his full compensation.

more eager

"impressionistic"

modern

—than

reaction

to support this... it

in

—

especially

they are to find

would

let

in plaintiffs.

it

and there

where insurance

is

some

own

fault unless

him recover

full

it

is

If this

authority

certainly be in tune with the

trend to disregard the victim's

Contrast the results

is

in

more

particularly

compensation.

This

Eckert and Wilson; the different outcomes turn on the courts' interpretations

of the voluntary encounter of a risk by the
acted voluntarily, stating: "...the
full notice,

could be argued that they appear to be

correct,

is

flagrant or obnoxious, and to

123

corollary doctrines] and thus give

to discover fault in defendants

obligatory or prevalent

England

It

its

over backwards in order not

plaintiff.

company

is

The minority

not liable to

in

Eckert pointed out that plaintiff

whose who, of their own choice and with

place themselves in the path of the train and are injured."

Id, at

507-08. The majority

never discussed this point.

124

"Fault of the injured party" as used in civil law jurisdictions

negligence

in that

it

is

broader than contributory

includes intentional behavior on the plaintiffs part. B.S. MARKESINIS,

German Law of Torts

90 (2d

ed. 1990).

The

41

view has been

officially

adopted by the 1964 Soviet Civil Code and

sanctioned by the French Cour de Cassation[.]

Thus, courts around the world appreciate the inequity resulting from the
application of contributory negligence and

125

Id., at

90-91.

all its

concomitant doctrines.

PART
A.

The

IV

How Assumption

subjective versus objective inquiry in application

A principle conflict with

secondary assumption of risk

the auspices of comparative fault in

encountering a

from

of Risk Conflicts with Comparative Fault

that

known

risk created

its

lies in its

focus on the subjective knowledge plaintiff has in

by the defendant. This type of knowledge (different

of contributory negligence which

is

an objective inquiry into any departure

from a reasonable person standard) conflicts with comparative
that both parties are

deemed negligent

tipping the scale one

way

application under

or the other.

fault for the

to a degree with the degree

simple notion

of fault on each part

The inquiry doesn't focus on subjective

knowledge but objective departure. Additionally, no inquiry

is

made

into

how

defendant's negligence was created, whether subjectively or objectively.

The problem

arises because the plaintiffs behavior could be construed either

subjectively or objectively wrong, depending

on how the

facts are

the defense affirmatively pleads secondary assumption of risk.

126

22 La.L.Rev. 17 (1961), supra note

13.

Mansfield states

pleaded and whether

The key here

is that

in part that:

[T]he energetic attack on assumption of risk as an independent liability-limiting
doctrine has been directed mainly at those cases in which the defendant acted

negligently and then, subsequently, the plaintiff, with

by the defendant's conduct, chose to encounter

knowledge of the

risk created

it.

* * *

Here are stripped away
relations

between the

all

the complications arising out of the need to adjust the

parties

and

to provide the

conduct."
Id, at

22.

42

defendant with a practical guide to

both

43

doctrines look to the plaintiffs behavior; one focuses on subjective and the other focuses

on objective. The

distinction

courts to apply the

wrong

among

Supreme Court

in

Springrose

fault, there is

v.

In

no clear authority as

to

to the state's

...

.

127

An

to the

adoption of

Springrose decision have

court used secondary assumption of the risk language

129

excellent discussion of this jury instruction confusion potential

Note. Instructing the Jury

summary

whether jury instructions on secondary

assumption of risk should be given. Cases subsequent

in the jury instructions.

at

has merged secondary assumption of the risk

Wilmore

trial

most notably

Minnesota, for example, although the state

and abolished both due

been upheld even though the

often blurred and has caused

97

instructions.

into contributory negligence

comparative

is

principles in deciding cases,
1

judgment and injury

two inquires

the

On Comparative

Fault Issues:

Nature of Comparison In Comparative Fault, 14

Wm.

is

found

in

Timothy Bettenga,

A Current Guide To Understanding

Mitchell L. Rev. 807 (1988).

the

The discussion

points out:

There

is

no reason

instructing

to

unduly emphasize one part of the plaintiffs conduct

on secondary assumption of the

risk.

Such an instruction would

prejudice to the plaintiff, just as instructing on specific acts of

in

result in

the defendant's

negligence would be prejudicial to the defendant.
* * *

As secondary assumption of

the risk

is

negligence, the courts must start treating
instructions to the jury.

In

doing

so,

nothing more than a form of comparative
it

as such

by eliminating any distinguishable

complex comparative

fault issues will

be

simplified.
Id., at

128

129

822-23.

292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W. 2d 826 (1971).

See, generally, 14

instruction.

Wm.

Mitchell L. Rev. 807, 820, for a recitation of cases using this form of jury

44

Hunn

In

steps

when

Windsor Hotel

v.

a plaintiff walked down obviously defective

other steps in better condition were available at no great inconvenience to the

Although

plaintiff.

Co.,

'

plaintiff (correctly) did not recover in the negligence suit, the court

labeled the plaintiffs contributory negligence as careless behavior and his implied

secondary assumption of the risk as "venturousness"

order to deny recovery to

No

Yet the court did not examine or distinguish the defendant's conduct.

plaintiff.

inquiry

in

was made

into the utility of the defendant's actions or the reasons

were defective, and for how
distinction at

all

why

long. Critics of this distinction argue that this

but an opportunity for two defenses to be plead.

is

the steps

not a

'

Consider the plaintiff who gets into a car with a drunk driver. If the defense
able to

show

that the plaintiff

assumption of risk applies
in the face

of it.

If the

objective departure

should have

known

plaintiff

was

that the driver

was drunk then secondary

subjectively aware of the danger and proceeded

defense can not show that the plaintiff knew, the principles of

still

(a

—

knew beforehand

is

apply

if facts

can be shown that tend to prove that the plaintiff

form of "willful blindness") of the danger. This objective

departure from reasonable care can be pleaded as the affirmative defense of secondary

assumption of risk.
In the

example shown above with the drunk

inferred based

on the plaintiffs behavior.

unreasonably accepting a ride

130

131

(i.e.,

119 W.Va. 215, 193 S.E. 57 (1937).

Prosser,

TORTS

§68.

driver,

two types of conduct could be

First, the plaintiff

could be seen as

a date with the drunk driver) or secondly, as

45

reasonable given the eircumstances
case, a subjective inquiry

would

should not have gone on the

(i.e.,

lead to

needing a ride due

two

to

different results:

ride, or; the plaintiff

an emergency).

The plaintiff on the date

had no choice but

to accept that ride

given the emergency (and even worse consequences for not accepting the

would

objective inquiry

plaintiff should

also lead to

two

different results:

In either

In the first

ride).

An

example the

have known (he was on a date with the drunk driver and observed her

heavy drinking),

or; in the

second example, the objective result could be that the plaintiff

should not have placed herself in a situation where a getting a ride with a drunk driver

was necessary or

that she

had no other reasonable

alternative.

B. Subjective versus objective inquiry confusion creates two defenses

Because the

plaintiff

is

held to either an objective or subjective inquiry, the

defendant has two defenses arising from a single occurrence. The
be plead affirmatively

at

summary judgment

to

first,

subjective, could

deny recovery. The second, objective,

could be shown inferentially through circumstantial evidence that the plaintiff acted in a

manner

inconsistent with that of an ordinary reasonable person under similar

circumstances. This type of evidence would necessitate jury instructions that would deny

recovery to the plaintiff if the jury feels there
plaintiff acted in a

assumed the
is

manner

sufficient inferential proof to

show

that

inconsistent with an ordinary, reasonable person such that he

risk (albeit impliedly).

weighed by the

is

In comparative negligence, a balance of the evidence

fact finder.

This conflicts with comparative fault principles that came about because of the
perceived inequities between plaintiffs and defendants during the

all

or nothing approach

46

of contributory negligence. With secondary assumption of risk (which courts
1

acknowledge has

the characteristics of contributory negligence

^9
) still

being applied

today, comparative negligence truly has not been fully implemented.

In order to

make comparative

fault

work

properly,

we must

trust the trier

of fact

to

be able to properly balance fault of the respective parties after vigorous argument on both
sides

132

133

is

heard.

133

22 La.L.Rev. 17(1961).

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct

client's position

CONDUCT

states:

"As an advocate,

under the rules of the adversary system."

Preamble, paragraph

[2]

(1983).

a lawyer zealously asserts the

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL

PART V The

Proposal for a Comparative Responsibility Analysis

A. Introduction to the analysis

The

principle contention of confusion outlined in this article

should analyze the plaintiffs behavior

As discussed
litigation

when

the analysis

is

In either case, the plaintiffs behavior is

the defendant's conduct leading to the event

in the

whether the court

an objective (contributory negligence) standard

in

or a subjective (assumption of the risk) standard.

examined and

is

is

assumed

to

be negligent.

previous section, this has led to confusing outcomes and lengthy

a simple adjudication of the facts

required:

It is

would lead

to better results.

A

shift in

time to weigh the balance of behaviors by each party in

determining the outcome of the

suit.

No

longer should just the behavior by the plaintiff

be the determining factor of whether recovery should be allowed or denied.

Secondary assumption of risk as a complete defense

to

negligence suits needs to

be cast into a more judicially applicable manner so as to be more conducive for proper
analysis by a jury. Instead of taking what

an issue of fact away from the jury, courts

is

should have them decide the varying degrees of asserted negligence on each party's part
(can

it

ever be said that both parties are exactly equal in fault?) and a host of external

factors vital to properly allocating fault to the respective parties.

Secondary assumption

of risk, whether reasonable or unreasonable, should be analyzed under a comparative
responsibility analysis model. This

model

is

inspired by a modified risk-utility analysis

47

48

promulgated

The proposed model of analysis,

for use in product defect cases.

modified herein, could be used

comparative

in

fault jurisdictions, replacing

assumption of risk analysis. In those jurisdictions
the

model would have no

as

secondary

following contributory negligence,

still

application.

Further support for this type of comparative responsibility analysis can be seen in

Dean Wade's
1

risk).

5

article (in

which he

calls for abrogation

of the term assumption of the

In his article, he points out that in various cases where the courts wrestled with

this concept, the possibility exists for either the plaintiffs

to

conduct or his implied consent

be unduly extended beyond the scope of the risk purportedly assumed.

part, that "[t]his is the test

risk

—and

the test

is

much

of negligence again
better perceived

Modifying

—balancing of magnitude versus
1

utility

of

6

risk-utility analysis into a

Risk-utility in the context

stated, in

and evaluated by the use of the negligence

terminology [rather than assumption of risk]."
1.

He

of product

comparative responsibility analysis

liability suits

was proposed

as a

method

to

address what was perceived to be weaknesses with the consumer expectancy test as
applied to design flaws.

134

See, e.g.

1

137

Am.L.Prod.Liab,

of Torts; Products Liability

Risk-utility analysis derived

§ 1:49;

§ 101,

Preliminary Draft No.

1

from the same school of thought

(April 20, 1993) Restatement (Third)

Reporter's Notes; O'Reilly and Cody,

The Products

Resource Manual (General Practice Section of the American Bar Association 1993).

135

See supra note 24.

136

Id, at 13.

,7

See supra note 129.

Liability

49
that called for the abolition of contributory negligence

and was

first

proposed

in

product

defect cases for the purpose of obviating the open and obvious hazard doctrine, which
as an unjust and harsh rule to bar plaintiffs from recovery.

was viewed

13

*

This doctrine

was a

corollary of assumption of the risk as any equipment with a dangerous condition

that

obvious

is

admonition
courts,

to a casual user

of the equipment necessarily would carry with

by using the equipment anyway.

that the user accepted such a risk

by adopting

risk-utility analysis in

open and obvious hazard

rule

it

the

Many

product defect cases, dropped the use of the

(which correlates

assumption of the

to implied

risk) as a

defense.

In

application, risk-utility in products liability centers primarily around the

its

concept of "reasonableness" and relative responsibility.

14

To

utilize this

concept in the

courtroom, the manufacturer's conduct in choosing a particular product design, especially

in

view of that product's

risk to its users, is
141

the product in that condition.

balanced against the

Of particular

importance

is

manufacturer to eliminate the risk without diminishing the

utility (or usefulness)

of

the ability of the

utility

of that product (which

138

Id.

139

Ogletree

Americas,

v.

Navistar International Transport., 194 Ga.App. 41, 390 S.E.2d 61 (1989); Banks

Inc.,

264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (reconsid. den.) (1994). The court held that public

policy dictate that the open and obvious rule should be done

140

See, for example, Suter v. San

Angelo Foundry

Milwa
Electric Tool Corp.
(1979);
?79); Milwaukee

v.

away

with.

& Machine Co.,

Superior Court,

etc.,

Restatement (Third) of the

Law of Torts,

81 N.J. 150,

15 Cal.App.4

24,36(1993).

141

v. ICI

Products Liability §

2.

th

406 A.2d 140, 145

547, 19 Cal. Reptr.2d

50

includes the price).

142

The

fact finder

is

given the role in these cases of considering

evidence of a reasonable design alternative
to

at the

determine whether to hold the manufacturer,

time of the manufacture of the product

seller or distributor liable for the

plaintiffs injuries resulting from the use of the product.

143

In

most

situations, is the

plaintiffs burden to produce such evidence of a reasonable, alternative design.

The Restatement

(Third) of Products Liability's language with regard to

"reasonable alternative design" can be of guidance in understanding

role

would work

144

in considering the utility

how the

fact finder's

of plaintiff and defendant's conduct. The

Restatement categorizes one form of product defect as such:

[A product]

harm posed by

is

defective in design

when

the foreseeable risks of

the product could have been reduced or avoided

by the

adoption of a reasonable alternative design... and the omission of the
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.

Building on this same form of analysis,
analysis,

couched

in

I

145

propose a modified form of risk-utility

terms of "comparative responsibility."

Much

as implied assumption

of risk (as applied through the open and obvious hazard rule) was replaced with the riskutility analysis in

product design cases, comparative responsibility would give proper

analysis to each party's role in the transaction that gave rise to the cause of action.

142

Id.

"'

Id,

comment

144

Id.

145

Id, § 2.

(c).

5!

Comparative responsibility analysis places more emphasis on allowing juries
comparative levels of responsibility each party has

weigh

to

given the factors of

to the other,

utility

of conduct and the alternatives available to each party. The overly generic and judicially
compliant term of implied assumption of the

Some

parallels

would no longer be used.

risk

between the Restatement (Third) regarding "reasonable alternative

design" and comparative responsibility can be drawn. For example, in product defects,
the fact finder determines, based

on evidence introduced by the

reasonable alternative design was available
146

distributed.

Under comparative

in that their determination

of

at the

plaintiff,

time the product was manufactured or

responsibility, the fact finder's role

liability

whether a

depends on the weighing of the

would be

utility

similar

of each

party's conduct given the circumstances and alternatives available at the time the injury

occurred. For both risk-utility analysis and comparative responsibility, the fact finder

is

asked to perform role of determining responsibility from a fairness and appropriateness of
responsibility perspective.

2.

146

Id,

Comparative

comment

(b).

responsibility's elements of analysis

"For the

liability

balancing of risks and benefits

in

system to be

fair

and

efficient,

judging product design and marketing must be done

knowledge of risks and risk-avoidance techniques reasonably

147

Id,

comment

achieved.

(a).

From a

"Society benefits most

when

careful users

the right, or optimal,

fairness perspective, requiring individual users and

in light

amount of product

consumers

of the

safety

is

to bear appropriate

consumers from being subsidized by

and consumers, when the former are paid damages out of funds

are forced to contribute through higher product prices."

that the

attainable at the time of distribution."

responsibility for proper product use prevents careless users and

more

most courts agree

to

which the

latter

52

The

proposal outlined herein consists of examining the

or value, of each

utility,

party's conduct leading up to the injury at issue. Additionally, the alternatives available

to

each party

time of the occurrence should also be examined to ascertain whether

at the

of each party's conduct. Stated

it

diminishes or increases the

utility

it

would resemble something

like this:

ofP 's Conduct)

*

(Alternatives Available at

(Utility

ofD

*

(Alternatives Available at Time of Occurrence) (- 1)

Conduct)

's

Time of Occurrence) (-1)

of this formula in determining fault for each party would be as

follows (where the plaintiff would be denied recovery): Defendant

street to

work within

the speed limit

when

wants to retrieve the hat and defendant

However,

numerous

X

and retrieve

it

wind

then.

Conduct = 100)

*

is

plaintiffs hat

on

his

way

to

blows

is

driving on the

into the street.

work. Both have

Plaintiff

utility for their

plaintiff has alternatives available (because these alternatives

will denote the

hat or wait for the

(P's

formulaic manner,

(Utility

An example

actions.

in

to

number).

blow

Illustrated

Two

possible alternatives are to either

his hat to the other side

by the formula,

(X Alternatives Available)(-1)

it

street

(D's Conduct = 100)

*

be

buy a new

where he can cross

would look something

(100)*

(100)*(-X)

of the

may

like this:

(0 Alternatives Available)(-1)

(0)

-lOOx

As

outlined above, the plaintiffs measure of fault

defendant's measure of fault

is (0).

is

(-100x) where the

In this case, because plaintiff and defendant both had

53
utility

of conduct

of action chosen,

Even

if

that

was equal but

one alternative were presented

would be measure

much

as

A. Examining the

in the

to the defendant,

middle of the

lesser than the plaintiff

alternatives available as denoted by

lies in

was presented with

alternatives to the course

plaintiff is denied recovery.

avoid hitting the plaintiff-pedestrian

A

plaintiff

utility

due

braking the vehicle to

street, his

measure of fault

to the plaintiffs

numerous

X above.

of each party's conduct

an argument for examining the

of the party's conduct in assessing fault

utility

the analogy presented by Prosser:

It

is

not every deliberate encountering of a

known danger which

reasonably to be interpreted as evidence of such consent
risk].

The jaywalker who dashes

in the path

into the street in the

[to

is

assumption of

middle of the block,

of a stream of cars driven in excess of the speed

limit, certainly

does not manifest consent that they shall use no care and run him down.

On

the contrary, he

for his safety;

is

insisting that they shall take

and while
i

immediate precautions

this is certainly contributory negligence,

it is

not

jo

assumption of risk."

The jaywalker may possess a subjective
slow down

to avoid

harming him, but the

the alternatives objectively available to

utility

the

148

utility

roadway chasing

of his conduct

is

very

weak considering

other reasonable person). Thus,

on the roadway

will not preclude

of rescuing the child and the lack of alternatives. Rushing in to

after a

prosser, Torts 450 §68.

of mind that cars seeing him will

him (and every

the utility of rushing in to save a stranded child

recovery due to the

state

windswept hat has

utility

but there are alternatives to this

54

course of action and therefore will preclude recovery.

measured follows

Can

it

utility is to

the alternatives available to each party

ever be said that consent

the discussion in Part HI

is

given where there are no alternatives? Recall

where the elements of assumption of risk are stretched, ignored

or twisted to suit the framework that the court feels
particular case. For example, in the

Conroy

case,

is

warranted by the facts of the

where a landlord's negligence

in

maintaining his tenant's only exit to the street did not impart consent on the tenant

he was forced to use the exit for lack of other alternatives.

It is

be

in part C.

Examining

B.

A discussion of how

when

149

important then to note whether feasible alternatives are available to the

plaintiff at the time of his consent to the defendant's negligently created occurrence.

Assumption of risk

differs greatly in this context

contributory negligence,

voluntary

149

150

Conroy

when

it is

in fact there

v. Briley,

(or

may

may

be)

of alternatives because, unlike

assumed

that the plaintiffs

not be alternatives.

150

in this regard

It is

element of voluntary acceptance of the defendant's negligence, which
in contributory

by the defendant,

being deemed a form of contributory negligence? The problem with

its

is

always

whether true

being applied

acrimonious effects.

to focus attention

is

upon the

sometimes, but not always,

negligence." Thus, where there are no alternatives available to the plaintiff

the time he encounters the negligently created event

concept

is

191 So.2d 601 (Fla.App.1966).

PROSSER, Torts 457 §68. "The term [assumption of risk] does serve

involved

behavior

in jurisdictions that

is

his behavioral

this,

of course,

is

at

consent really
that this

no longer recognize contributory negligence because of

55

consent given viable alternatives

time of the injury to the plaintiff has truly

at the

occurred.

C. Applying the

As

of conduct with the alternatives available

utility

utilized in negligence suits, comparative responsibility analysis could

be

presented in a statutory form similar to the following:
Plaintiffs conduct in encountering (or assuming) the impliedly

created by the defendant

conduct against the

is

utility

analysis of whether there

should

include:

utility

be balanced by the

known

risk

utility

of the plaintiffs

of the defendant's conduct.

Factors in the

to

is

culpable negligence on each parties' side

of

(usefulness)

plaintiffs

conduct,

utility

(usefulness) of defendant's conduct, the gravity (severity) of the danger

known

plaintiff of defendant's

to

defendant's

defendant

at

If plaintiffs

conduct

and the

conduct, plaintiffs ability to avoid

alternatives

presented

to

plaintiff

and

time of the occurrence.

conduct

is

equal or greater in terms of negligence than with

the defendant's conduct weighing

barred from recovery.
defendant's with

all

the

all

the above factors, then plaintiff

If plaintiffs

conduct

is

is

not as negligent as

above factors properly considered, then plaintiffs

recovery should be reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to
plaintiff.

A

comparison with the above sample

responsibility to a

model comparative

fault statute

statute

implementing comparative

(below) does not reveal great

differences in effect except for the crucial elements of utility of each party's conduct and
the alternatives available at the time of the occurrence.

The Uniform Comparative Fault Act

151

"This

is

states:

undoubtedly the most frequent error of attorneys, and even of the courts,

the defense[s of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk]."

Id., at

450.

in

dealing with

56
§

[Effect

1.

(a) In

death

of Contributory

an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or
to

person or harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable to
diminishes

claimant

the

Fault].

damages

compensatory
contributory

fault,

proportionately

for

an

injury

amount

the

attributable

but does not bar recovery.

to

awarded
the

as

claimant's

This rule applies whether or

not under prior law the claimant's contributory fault constituted a defense
or

was disregarded under applicable

such as

legal doctrines,

last clear

chance.
(b) "Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any

measure negligent or

reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that

subject a person to

assumption

unreasonable

warranty,

The term

strict tort liability.

also includes breach

risk

of

not

constituting

of

an

enforceable express consent, misuse of a product for which the defendant

otherwise would be
to mitigate
fault

as

added).

liable,

and unreasonable

failure to

avoid an injury or

damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply both

the

basis

for

liability

and

to

contributory

fault

to

(emphasis

152

The major difference between these two provisions

is

that the latter

Uniform

Comparative Fault Act assigns implied assumption of risk into a category of

fault that

does not necessarily terminate the plaintiffs cause of action but only diminishes her
recovery.

The former provision does not attempt

to categorize the different labels

of fault

(formerly defenses) but assigns a general comparative responsibility scheme.

Application of the

much

152

the

same manner

utility

of conduct on each party's part

that the jury

Unif. Comparative Fault

Act

§

1

examines the attributable

(1977).

The model

Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

statute

was

is left

fault to

written by

to the jury.

In

each person as

The National

57

outlined in the Comparative Fault model above, the jury utilizing the eomparative
responsibility analysis assigns utility towards each person's conduct.

same

The

analysis

the

is

as if the jury were comparing fault; comparative responsibility asks the juror not to

allocate percentages of fault but percentages of utility. Thus,

evidence or pleading one's case

her client's conduct has more

utility

shift in presenting

Instead of attempting to convince a

to the jury occurs.

jury that their opponent was wholly (or mostly)

no great

the advocate

at fault

makes her case

that

than the other party's, given the alternatives

available.

This theory of comparative responsibility analysis modified from product defects'
risk-utility analysis to

carries

apply in secondary assumption of risk situations in negligence

more weight when economic

analysis factors are considered. In

economic

analysis of the law, the costs of certain conduct and the costs of those consequences (or

avoiding those consequences) are examined to determine

scheme of laws. More importantly,

it

how

it

fits

within the current

forms a basis for suggesting better ways

to

implement or even change those laws. Indeed, a strong economic criticism of
contributory negligence that hastened

when

its

demise were the inequitable results achieved

the party least able to bear the misfortunes of

its

injuries

was asked

to

do

so.

Posner's premise that risk preferrers would be willing to "trade on their taste"

by willingly waiving
plaintiffs

could

still

cost-justified precautions

have prevented injury by

other words, plaintiffs

153

may

on the defendant's

their

own

part does not

cost-justified precautions.

encounter risks others do not because they

POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW.

mean

may

or

may

that

In

not

58

have

cost-justifiable alternatives available at the time of acquiescence

no other alternatives are available.

154

due

to the fact that

But, let's not confuse this with assuming the

155

risk.

Meshing

the philosophy of economic analysis with comparative responsibility, a

clear picture of

how to

presents

In this regard, plaintiffs conduct and the utility of such conduct can be

itself.

illustrate the interaction

weighed against defendant's conduct and

of plaintiff s and defendant's behavior

utility

of such (comparative

fault principles

here) with the added factors of the utility of plaintiff s implicit agreement to

defendant's created

risk, plaintiffs ability to

assume

avoid defendant's conduct and other

alternatives presented at the time of the behaviorally-created assumption of risk. This

important because

it

enables the jury to play a role in allocating blame rather than having

the court summarily bar the plaintiffs

The

factors

is

suit.

enumerated above, particularly the

and the possibility of alternatives, better

illustrate the

utility

of each person's conduct

"complete picture" of the

circumstances leading to the risks a plaintiff may have assumed and perhaps more
importantly, why. This complete picture

allocating fault

on

either party

is

what should be

relied

and whether an award of damages

upon by
is

the jury in

merited in the cause

of action.

5

[OJther factors, which remain to be considered,

the risk

may

be assumed

is

TORTS 447 §68 (emphasis

155

See supra note

1.

may

by no means conclusive as
in original).

1

affect the 'voluntary choice

to

whether

it

;

and the

fact that

has been assumed." PROSSER,

59

This balance of factors can be derived from present case law that

utility

analysis originates in product defect cases. Those factors incorporated the concept

of "reasonableness,"

B.

utilize the risk-

Some

156

which underlies the comparative responsibility analysis herein.

hypothetical examples of comparative responsibility

A plaintiff may be fully aware of one risk (and acquiescent in
necessarily fully aware of another risk which

may be aware

example, he

where he

is

that a car

is

is

it)

but not

the proximate cause of his injuries. For

speeding, but not that the driver

is

not watching

going.

Comparative responsibility analysis eliminates the need

to ascertain

whether the

defense of assumption of risk or contributory negligence should be plead and also the

need to have the jury consider whether the plaintiff departed from a subjective standard
(assumption of risk) or an objective standard (contributory negligence). Instead, the
utility

of each party's conduct

time of the injury.

156

157

is

balanced against the alternatives available to each

at the

158

264 Ga. 732, 734-736. See also supra notes 135 and 136.

Jewell

v.

Schmidt.

1

Wis.2d 241, 83 N.W.2d 487 (1957); Cassidy

v.

Quisenberry, 346 S.W.2d 304

(Ky.1961).

138

Support for

this

Hood, 427 So. 2d

The

court, in

subjective

1

contention can be found in the dictum of the concurring opinion in Entrevia

v.

146 (La.1983), where a person entered a dilapidated building and injured himself.

denying recovery by the

knowledge

at the

plaintiff,

found that he had assumed the risk based on

his

time he entered the building. The concurring opinion, while agreeing

with the outcome, was troubled by the notion that the majority found that the building posed a
reasonable risk of harm to trespassers.

60

Consider
1

"

9

this hypothetical:

Assume

driver.

The guest who accepts

knowledge of the

the guest had

a ride with the intoxicated

driver's intoxication.

After getting in

the car, the driver proceeds to have an accident proximately related to his state of

At

inebriation.

part

should the driver be able to claim assumption of risk on the

this point,

of the guest?

Using comparative responsibility analysis, the

first

issue to analyze

of plaintiffs conduct compared to the defendant's conduct. Here,
situation

where the guest was simply looking

defendant

may

have justifiable

be driving

home

utility for their actions,

the utility

we may have

for a ride to the local bus station.

consuming too many drinks

after

is

at

but to complete this picture

a

The

a local bar. Both

we need

to

examine

the alternatives available to each.

In

view of these

alternatives, plaintiff

had other opportunities for that free

ride;

when

presented with the choice of grabbing a ride with the drunk driver, he should have

relied

on the

alternative of waiting for a ride with a sober driver.

available to the intoxicated driver are plenty; a taxi ride

Justice

was

Watson wrote,

likely that children,

In a

or a ride with a sober

it

tramps or others straying on the premises might be injured. [However],

if

could recover]?"

ruin.

would not an unreasonable

Id., at

risk

such,

it

had

little utility

whether something posed a reasonable

of harm be found [by the court so

risk

this

by declaring

of harm by examining

economic and moral. Oster

v.

that

its utility

such an analysis of

should be based on

Dept. of Transportation

&

Admittedly, most states have abrogated the use of assumption of risk

hypothetical

still

has good use.

in this

many

Development, 582

So.2d 1285, 1289 (La. 1991) (Justice Kimball dissenting opinion).

b9

a

1151.

subsequent decision the court expounded on

factors including social,

As

alternative

and

"Clearly, the building

small child were the 'trespasser.'
that the child

was a

home

The

area but the

62
in an accident proximately caused by the intoxicated driver. Plaintiff sues driver; the jury

examines the evidence using comparative responsibility

Each

party has utility (or usefulness) behind their actions. Plaintiff needed to go

to the hospital to save his life;

defendant needed to get

trying to save plaintiffs

A

life).

home

(or, in

the alternative,

was

survey of the alternatives available presents a more

complete picture of the negligence of each
alternatives.

analysis.

party.

Plaintiff

had no other feasible,

realistic

Defendant had alternatives (recalling those from the preceding scenario).

Weighing these
damages. The

factors in the appropriate

utility

manner, plaintiff should then be awarded

of plaintiffs conduct with the added analysis of the alternatives

is

greater than defendant's utility of conduct and his numerously available alternatives.

(P's

Conduct = 100)

(100)*

*

(D's Conduct = 100)

(0 Alternatives)(-1)

(100)*

(0)

*

(X Alternatives)(-1)

(-x)

-lOOx

In the previous examples the alternatives available to each party

In the following

example the

will be the ballpark scenario.

utility

160

of each person's conduct

The current

state

of affairs

is

is

were examined.

discussed. This example

to preclude a plaintiff

from

receiving an award of damages based on his implied assent to the possibility of being
struck by an errant baseball bat or hockey puck.

160

Although, arguably,

this scenario is

moot

for purposes

beyond academic discussion as most

professional sports have (or should have) assumption of risk waivers on the tickets. This

would

an express contract of assumption of risk between the stadium owner(s) and the spectator.

create
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Each

party derives utility from their actions. Plaintiff

entertainment while defendant profits from having the
their utilities are intertwined

to preventing injury.

and dependant on each

Plaintiff could stay at

could construct costly wire mesh

However,

spectators.

to

is

going to go to a

game performed

(in this

Each party has an

other).

home and watch

the

game 161

game

for

regard

alternative

or defendant

completely prevent the possibility of harm to the

this alternative

diminishes the

utility

of both plaintiffs and

defendant's actions.
In our example plaintiff

struck by a puck. In his suit for damages, the complete

is

picture of the utility of each party's actions

each.

Since plaintiff derived

utility

from the

toward

who

meshing

is

utility

profit of hosting the

is

weighed with the alternatives available

from viewing the game

live

to

and defendant derived

game, the alternatives available

may

tip the

balance

wins. If defendant's alternative of completely enclosing the arena with wire

viewed as having

better utility than the plaintiff staying at

the game, then plaintiff wins and the defendant

meshing. If plaintiff s

utility

of staying

at

would be required

home

is

viewed as

home and watching

to construct the wire

less than

defendant enclose the arena (because the value of going to the

game

is

having the
diminished), then

the defendant wins.

The key

to analyzing this fact pattern then is to balance the utility

actions against the alternatives available.

one person's part reduces the overall

As

utility

illustrated above, utilizing

toward the other person. In

of each party's

an alternative on
this

example, a

compromise of sorts has already been reached because of their interdependent

161

Murphy

v.

Steeplechase

his opinion wrote,

Amusement

"The timorous may

Co.,

nature.

250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173 (1929). Justice Cardozo

stay at

home."

in

64

Baseball fields and hockey arenas have partial enclosures to protect those fans very close

to the action, but

do not extend out

to those areas

where fans are further from the

This compromise has an economic premise: The value of watching the
screen

is

not outweighed by being struck by a 95 fastball but

of catching a foul

possibility

economic

may have an economic

utility

of $50. In apportioning

utility

game behind

a

outweighed by the

ball.

For example, plaintiffs conduct prior
created risk

is

action.

to

encountering defendant's negligently-

of $100 while defendant's conduct has an

utility

of conduct,

it

can be said that plaintiffs

behavior was twice as useful as defendant's (or 200 percent greater) and thus plaintiff
should be entitled to recover. Determination of this

is left

and

to the jury

is

not based on

a hard and fast rule but rather an examination of the facts surrounding the injury.

Prosser stated, implied assumption of the risk [in

the

myriad

its

facts in every conceivable situation that

present form]

is

As

hard to apply due to

can occur.

C. Simplifying the problem of multiple defendants

Suppose

Plaintiff sues three defendants:

$100.00. Each party has

jurisdictions

some degree of fault

which apply comparative

instruct the jury

on

A, B, and

C

for

damages

in the

amount of

attributable to their actions. In

fault principles, the possibility

of having

to

different defense principles exists in the following example. This

simple illustration of combining four defendants (one with no defense theory, two with a
theory of common negligence on the plaintiffs part and one with a defense of assumption

of risk). Where different percentages of fault are attributable to each party under
comparative responsibility but not traditional comparative fault (due to the Def. A's

"

See supra note

1
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assertion

of assumption of risk), with the

possibility

of damages apportionment

is

as

follows:

Type of defense

Percentage of fault

If

Plaintiff

20%

Def.

A

30%

Def.

B

30%

Common

negligence

Def.

C

20%

Common

negligence

assumption of risk

is

Comparative

fault

Assumption of risk (secondary)

a bar to recovery

from A, then the complicated issue of

whether plaintiff recovers from the other parties
properly instructing the jury. And,

that the

available

if

arises, in addition to the

the plaintiff does recover, there

is

problem of

the possibility

measure of damages awarded may not be the proper amount. Under comparative

responsibility analysis, each party

is

allocated a percentage of fault based

on the

utility

of

each party's conduct weighed against the alternatives available to each.

1.

B and C "piggyback" on A's

In this hypothetical, plaintiff is

30 percent attributed

to plaintiff

defense

now 50

percent at fault (plaintiffs 20 percent plus A's

through his secondary assumption of risk). In modified

comparative negligence jurisdictions,

B and C walk away from

the cause of action as

their level

of fault together would not surpass the 50 percent threshold plaintiff needs to

overcome

in order to recover.

163

In

most jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions would allow for recovery

than defendant(s). Here,

it is

amount of 50 percent of the
without compensation.

assumed

total, are

if plaintiff is

that plaintiff recovers nothing since his

equivalent to plaintiffs

own

not

more negligent

damages, reduced

in the

proportion of damages incurred

66

The conclusive
compensation

effect

of

B and C

for the injury caused

plaintiff never recovers if there

is

is

any

acting in a negligent

manner without providing

similar to contributory negligence.

fault,

however

may

slight that

be,

Recall that

on

his part. This

defeats the policy reasons for the demise of contributory negligence, as discussed in Part

III.

With the principles of contributory negligence

assumption of risk analysis,

it is

very possible that

still

B and C

defense to completely deny recovery on the plaintiffs
2.

could "piggyback" on A's

part.

Jury confusion potential

Even
pay

prevalent in secondary

if plaintiff is able to

their share

of damages either due

during deliberations. Here,
the evidence

shows

this situation is

recover

their

at

law against

to possible

B and C

they

still

may

not have to

confusion on the part of the

A has an affirmative defense while B

and

trier

of fact

C must plead

that

conduct has not risen to a level of negligence. The fact finder in

asked to consider the plaintiffs behavior

in

the subjective standard of whether he acted in a reasonable

two

different contexts: First,

manner when he encountered

defendant A's negligently created event and second, the objective reasonable person
standard of ordinary negligence.

It is

very possible that the fact finder

behavior into the analysis of whether

it is

"carry over" the analysis of the plaintiffs

B and C were

fact considers that the plaintiff acted in

negligently created event of A,

may

negligent.

If,

for example, the trier

of

an unreasonable manner when encountering the

entirely possible that this behavior will be imparted

against the plaintiff in considering the negligence of

B and C

even though the affirmative

defense no longer applies. In some jurisdictions courts refuse to submit separate

67

instructions for assumption of risk and comparative negligence finding the potential for

confusion too
3.

great.

The proper measure

of

damages may not be awarded

Finally, consider whether plaintiff will receive the proper

Ideally, given that plaintiff

jointly

and severally

should receive

is

is

20 percent

liable for the

at fault

measure of damages.

and A, B, and

C

are

assumed

to

be

remaining 80 percent of damages, the most plaintiff

$80.00. Also, plaintiff may only recover $50.00 if the trier of fact finds,

using comparative responsibility analysis, that A's conduct had more

utility

than

plaintiffs given the alternatives available at the time of the event. In either case, the

minimum award would
However,

if the trier

used in comparative
or nothing at

scenarios

1

all.

and

comparative

Looking

be $50.00.

2,

fault

to

of fact

relies

fault courts, plaintiff faces the prospect

The

return of no

As

for

B

award could be due

164

,h

4

to either the results

comparative responsibility analysis, plaintiffs

and C's

B

and C, the

utility since their

utility

utility

behavior violated

A at the time the event occurred.

of conduct

is

of conduct on plaintiffs part

common

A, the analysis would be the same, where each party's

and

achieved in

would be defeated.

weighed against the other with added weight given
plaintiff

of recovering either $50.00

discussed above. In either situation, the policy principles behind

weighed against A, B, and C. For
outweighs

on the secondary assumption of risk analysis now

negligence principles.

utility

of conduct

is

to the alternatives available to

This analysis then would have two

Annotation, Effect ofAdoption of Comparative Negligence Rules on Assumption of Risk, 16 A.L.R.
700. 703 §2(1982).
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outcomes: Either

of damages allocated
($80.00

below

if

A

(total

A

plaintiff recovers against

to plaintiff

liable to plaintiff;

from

$50.00

three parties

all

if

A

is

amount of damages being equal

Percentage of

fault

or he doesn't. In either case, the

Type of defense

measure

would be the proper amount

not liable to plaintiff). Refer to the chart

to $100.00):

A

available

liable

A

not liable

Plaintiff

20%

Comparative respons. analysis

-$20.00

-$20.00

A

30%

Comparative respons. analysis

+30.00

-$30.00

B

30%

Common

negligence

+$30.00

+$30.00

C

20%

Common

negligence

+$20.00

+$20.00

D. Revisiting the four introductory cases
This

article

began with four cases highlighting problems

in the area

of applying

secondary assumption of risk. This subsection re-examines the outcomes of those cases
using comparative responsibility.

1.

The

case of the thwarted verdict, revisited

Mr. Harris recovered damages of $90,000
even though he was found only 15 percent

at fault

percentage as secondary assumption of the

risk.

165

in this case but

was denied recovery

because the jury construed his

The

trial court,

despite

reluctance to do so and the jury's intention, upheld complete denial of

defense's motion.

165

Harris

v.

Hercules Incorporated, 328 F.Supp. 360 (Ark. 1971).

its

obvious

damages on

the

69

Using comparative

responsibility analysis, the critical element

of analysis

lies

with the alternatives available to the parties. Mr. Harris, as an employee of the defendant

Hercules Incorporated, had no alternatives available because he was hired to do the work

and he was led

to believe that the line

alternative of not

working on the

lose his job, something he

power

the

line

was

he was working near was de-energized. The

line is irrelevant

would not reasonably wish

safe to be near. Hercules,

energizing the power line or not sending

its

to the fact that

it

failed to use

to

it

would cause Mr. Harris

do given the fact

to

that he thought

on the other hand, had the alternative of de-

employees near unsafe

comparative responsibility, Hercules would be

due

because

at fault for

lines.

In using

100 percent of the damages

an available alternative to avoid creating a situation of

166

risk to the plaintiff.

Using the proposal herein, the jury would not have
fault that

the jury

were probably arrived

would simply weigh

(as discussed

injuries.

above)

at in

a

somewhat

arbitrary

to assign percentage values of

manner. As a factual matter,

the alternatives available along with the utility of conduct

to reach the conclusion that

Hercules was responsible for the

Clearly, in the actual findings the jury's desire to

award Mr. Harris a majority

percentage of damages was contravened by the confusing jury instructions that utilized
the phrase, "assumption of risk." This confusion served as the death knell for any

recovery by Mr. Harris

166

To

was

reach this outcome,

a paid

at all.

it

is

employee assigned

assumed
to

that each party has sufficient utility for their actions.

complete a task and Hercules gained profit from

performing certain services. This assessment of utility within
issue decided by the jurors.

this proposal, as

its

Harris

employees

always,

is

a factual

70
2.

The

case of the sentient eight-year old, revisited

167

Utilizing a far-fetched notion of secondary assumption of risk, the court denied

recovery by the Harvards against the Stewarts when they
in their

house because they found

that

left

an eight-year old boy alone

he had assumed the risk of his death

when he

played with matches in an empty house, save for another boy, aged ten. They held the

deceased boy has significant appreciation for the causal chain of events that could lead

to

his death.

Under comparative
factors

is

responsibility, the issue

would have gone

of utility of conduct and alternatives available would be

arguably no

utility

of conduct

actions of the persons

in playing with

who were away from

to the jury.

tried.

In this case, there

matches and certainly some

their

house

at the

The

utility for the

time (shopping, working,

et

cetera).

Alternatives again are crucial however.

sending Scott Harvard

home

before they

parents that they were leaving

the opportunity to bring

other

left to

him

left

The Stewarts had

the house.

They could have informed

there alone with their ten-year old son, giving

him home. One could have stayed with

given the fact that boys

at this

is this

v.

Harvard,

et al.,

239 Ga.App. 388, 520 S.E. 2d 752 (1999).

his

them

two boys while

the

in the house,

a realistic alternative,

age need parental supervision because they lack

capacity for their actions?

Stewart

the

do what needed done outside the house. As for the boys alone

they had the alternative of not playing with matches. But,

167

the alternative of

full

71

In this case, the alternatives tip against the Stewarts.

of alternatives, they effectively

failed

Scott from dying in the resulting

The

3.

blower while

fire.

Jones became seriously injured

was diverted

his attention

damages against

not utilizing their choice

under comparative responsibility analysis to keep

case of the thwarted verdict, part

Sammie

By

to

II,

revisited

when he

two young

168

arm

in a

walking by.

He

stuck his

girls

the manufacturer and no assumption of the risk charge

running snow
recovered

was ever read

into the jury instructions.

Under comparative
he had some

utility for his

snow-blower with a
First,

to

responsibility,

Mr. Jones would not have recovered. Although

conduct by attempt to dislodge whatever was jamming the

stick he picked

up nearby, he had easily available alternatives

to him.

he could have turned off the machine. Second, he could have paid more attention

what he was doing

as he stuck the tree branch inside the blower. Third, he could

have

called a qualified repairman.

Defendant, on the other hand, utilized
users of

was

its

its

alternatives readily available.

product that sticking body parts inside the machinery while

potential harmful. Other warnings

made

it

clear that great risk

it

came

It

warned

was operating
to those

who

did not operate the machine in a safe manner. Mr. Jones himself acknowledged that these

alternatives did in fact occur.

168

169

Jones

He

v.

M.T.D. Products,

169

Inc.,

507 F.Supp. 8 (Penn. 1980).

admitted he never read the operating manual but did acknowledge that there

actions.

507 F.Supp.

8,

10 (Penn. 1980).

was danger

in his

72

The

4.

case of the well-chosen rule of law, revisited

This was a diversity
injury that occurred at

this

fault)

brought

him using

used a tenuous connection
(comparative

suit

Wisconsin by a Pennsylvania resident for an

in

a machine he bought in Pennsylvania.

at best to justify

The

federal court

applying Wisconsin's rule of law

over Pennsylvania law (contributory negligence).

They accomplished

through the use of a conflict of laws rule that has been criticized for being to

manipulative

171

at best.

The motivating

factor behind the court's decision

was

to

avoid

unjust and harsh results from the application of an unjust rule.

The problem with

this

was

the willingness to give the plaintiff a chance to

proceed under a negligence cause of action without much regard

to the merits

of his

claim. For, despite those merits, had the court chosen Pennsylvania law, plaintiff

would

have been completely barred had the defendant shown any

part at

all.

Those

focus, rather than being

on the

suit itself,

fault

on the plaintiffs

was on the avoidance of premature

dismissal of the suit altogether.

Comparative responsibility avoids

this result as there are~no all or

nothing rules of

contributory negligence to apply, even the underlying defense of implied secondary

assumption of risk. Without having

170

171

Decker

v.

Fox River Tractor

Co.,

to focus

on inequitable

results that could attain, the

324 F.Supp. 1089 (Wis. 1971).

Professor Leflar's five choice influencing factors, as used by the court in Wisconsin, are often

criticized as indefinite
states.

See Cavers,

Choice of Law

and uncertain since the five factors can be evaluated differently by different

THE CHOICE OF LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS, 207

in the Courts,

34 Mercer L. Rev. 521 (1983).

(1985); Kay, Theory into Practice:

73

court instead could locus

more on

the merits of the claim

the rule with the least harsh possible outcome.

itself,

instead of trying to seek

Part VI. Criticisms of the Comparative Responsibility Analysis

A

principle criticism of this approach advocated in this Article

is

that

"cooperative negligence" of the parties should not allow the plaintiff to recover.

plaintiff

When

injured by the concurrent negligent acts of himself and the defendant, he

is

should not be able to recover.
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To

this criticism, the

proper response

is

to consider the

principles that led to the decline of contributory negligence itself and the balance

proposed herein. In an instance where cooperative negligence has occurred (where each
party has either 100 percent or

utility,

behavior are also examined to arrive
this logic

may assume

that

Another criticism

at the

each party

alternatives available to each party

is

concurrently), the alternatives to the negligent

is

proper allocation of fault on each

equally at fault; again, an examination of

would properly

that plaintiffs

allocate fault

may be rewarded

on either

for their

side.

bad behavior.

Proponents of contributory negligence emphasize their belief that plaintiffs

any measure of damages would not be vigilant
fold:

First,

it

would be an assumption

think that a person

would not look

hurt themselves, they can recover

that

after his

172

Menger

Mo.

38. 23

compared

v.

in their

own

safety.

who

The response

receive

is

two-

goes against the grain of human nature to

own

personal safety simply because,

20 cents on the dollar for

Second, with regard to the proposal outlined in
behavior,

Also,

part.

their pain

this article, the utility

to defendant's, with the proper analysis

and

if

they

suffering.

of plaintiff s

of alternatives available

to

Lauer, 55 N.J.L. 205, 26 A. 180 (1893); Herrell v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 324

S.W.2d 102(1929).

74

75

each,

would

plaintiff

still

who

give us the correct determination of fault on each side. For example, the

rushes into the street to save a child has acted badly, but the alternatives

(serious injury to the child) outweigh this

save a hat has some

(buying a

new

utility,

but this

is

fault.

Conversely, rushing into the street to

greatly outweighed

by the alternatives available

hat versus potentially paying thousands of dollars in medical expenses).

A compelling criticism may be that judicial activism would be required to
implement these principles since
Admittedly, a major issue
presents in the courtroom

state legislatures

problems

in resolving the

is,

have been
that

silent

on

this issue.

17j

secondary assumption of risk

short of statutory implementation, that

it

will require judicial

activism to have the analysis imparted in the process.
Critics of this cringe at the thought of the

bench creating new laws and abrogating

those already in place. But, consider this notion: Contributory negligence

created doctrine.

174

a judicially

In their attempts to modernize or ameliorate the harsh effects of

contributory negligence, the courts fashioned

became known

is

as the Erosion Principle.

5

many

exceptions to the rule. This practice

Over time, confusing

rules

and ever more

confusion in the application of these rules were created.

J

Dean Wade, Comments on Maki

v.

Frelk

Comparative

Court or the Legislature Decide?, 21 Vanderbilt

common-law adversary system where one

L.

Contributory Negligence: Should the

Rev. 889 (1968). The

party should

contributory negligence because apportioning

vs.

damages

win and
is

article suggests that the

the other should lose rewards use of

"unworthy of the

common

law and suitable

only for the untutored lay mind or perhaps occasionally in equity." However, the author overlooks the
fact that contributory negligence itself is a judicially created doctrine.

174

175

Keeton, Creative Continuity

in the

Law of Torts,

PROSSER, ET al., TORTS 569-572 (9

th

Ed. 1994).

75 Harv. L. Rev. 463 (1962).

76

By

contrast,

most of the

schemes have done so through
fault

forty-six states that

through judicial activism, the

to

force of jurisdictional pull.

legislation,

176

seems

It

to leave contributory negligence

their state legislators or the

In one compelling

Tennessee recognized

adopt comparative

followed with statutes.

were unable

do so by either

1

for those states that did

state legislatures

that the courts, absent legislative action,

behind unless compelled

As

legislation.

have adopted comparative negligence

example of hesitation

overwhelming
in

absence of

that contributory negligence could operate to thwart

justice yet waited nearly 16 years to find the proper opportunity to

change

to

comparative

178

fault.

176

578.

Id., at

177

Alabama probably

bests exemplifies this reluctance to act without legislative authorization.

In a

recent opinion, the court, despite overwhelming reasons to do so and support from academicians and

other jurisdictions, stated:

We

have heard hours of

oral

argument;

we have

read numerous briefs;

we have

studied cases from other jurisdictions and law review articles; and in numerous

conferences

surrounding

we have
such

a

discussed

change.

at

depth this issue and

After

this

exhaustive

all

study

of the ramifications

and these

lengthy

deliberations, the majority of the Court, for various reasons, has decided that

we

should not abandon the doctrine of contributory negligence, which has been the law
in

Williams

178

Alabama

v.

Mclntyre

for approximately 162 years.

Delta International Machine Corp., 619 So.2d 1330 (Ala.1993).

v. Ballantine,

833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992). The Supreme Court of Tennessee, making

reference to an earlier decision, announced

"[s]uch a case

The
to say

is

when

it

finally

adopted comparative negligence that

before us."

earlier decision

when asked

was

Street v. Calvert, 541

to adopt comparative negligence:

S.W.2d 576 (Tenn.

1976).

The court had

this

77
It

occurred

should not be overlooked as well that a form of judicial "non-activism" has
in this arena.

For years, courts have acknowledged

that plaintiffs

have received

favorable jury verdicts despite evidence to the contrary (such evidence showing
contributory negligence). These so-called "compromise verdicts" are a fact of the court

system that has been acknowledged

The problem with
court

these

for

some

compromise

time.

17

verdicts

is

that the jury

is

doing what the

unwilling to do: Awarding damages in a case that the evidence shows should not

is

be done due to some form of contributory negligence on the plaintiffs party that should
prevent an award otherwise. If the courts were to acknowledge that comparative fault

should completely abrogate

all

forms of assumption of risk (except primary) and take

steps to do so, then these types of verdicts

evil:

Compromise

An

would not be necessary. Choose your

verdicts or judicial activism.

interesting

example of judicial activism occurred

of Germany. After the enactment of a statute

We

lesser

do not deem

it

appropriate to consider

to

in the civil

law jurisdiction

allow for apportionment of damages

making such

a

change unless and

180
,

until a

case reaches us wherein the pleadings and proof present an issue of contributory

negligence accompanied by advocacy that the ends of justice will be served by

adopting the rule of comparative negligence.
Id., at

179

Karcesky

586.

v. Laria,

382 Pa. 227, 114 A. 2d 150 (1955) provides an excellent example of this

dictum.

180

§

254

BGB
If

to

any

(F.R.G.)
fault

(German

Civil Code). This code section provides:

of the injured party has contributed to causing the damage, the obligation

compensate the injured party and the extent of the compensation to be made

depends upon the circumstances[.]

in

its

78

the

Supreme Court of Germany swung away from

application of the statute and began

considering cases of contributory negligence to bar claims under a statute that governed

unlawful tortious acts

In effect, the Court

.

began

to find that plaintiffs

who assumed

the risk of their injuries were acting in an unlawful manner.

The Supreme Court changed

this

approach because of its harsh results and once

again began applying the statute intended to cover situations where assumption of the risk
This code section

occurs, § 254.
allocation of the

damages between

is

viewed as more flexible because

it

allows an

the parties.

Consider also the bold move of the courts

in the state

of Georgia. They took the

bold step of expanding a statute once applicable only to railroads into a rule of law
applicable in

all

negligence cases.

Finally, critics

may

point out that litigation

would become increasingly complex

with regard the comparative responsibility analysis proposed. However, a counterpoint
to this criticism is that

This

181

§

is

may encourage

settlement by the parties. Instead of going

a very flexible approach.

823(1)
[1]

BGB
A

(F.R.G.)

BGHZ

34,

(German

Civil Code). This code section provides:

person who, willfully or negligently, unlawfully injures [another]

compensate hime

182

it

for

is

bound

to

any damage arising therefrom.

355 (363). The Supreme Court no longer considered assumption of the risk to be

unlawful behavior but rather as behavior that could reduce damages under § 254. See also, 2 JULIUS

—Recht Der
SchuldverhAltnisse (A Commentary on the German Civil Code — Law of Obligations),
Von Stauzinger, Kommentar Zum BUrgerlichen Gesetzbuch

Teil,

2871 (ll

th

ed. 1975).

5

79

forward on an

and

settle.

all

or nothing suit, the parties

would be encouraged

to reach a

This would have the net effect of reducing personal injury cases in the court

system and creating a more streamlined approach

to litigation.

The

trend toward

mediation and other forms of alternate dispute resolution underscore that

would work

1

compromise

this

approach

well.

QT
"

Goodrich, Origin of the Georgia Rule of Comparative Negligence and Apportionment of Damages,

Ga. Bar. A.

J.

174(1940).

PART
Comparative
assumption of the
attempt to find

VII Conclusion

fault jurisdictions presently face

The confusion centers around

risk to negligence suits.

some acknowledgement

confusion in applying implied

or agreement for the plaintiff to

the courts'

assume

risk

based on her behavior alone. The traditional elements of assumption of risk, knowingly,
voluntarily and full appreciation of the risk involved, are often overlooked or created at

summary judgment

level in barring a claim or allowing

cases in the Introduction illustrate, there

proceed to
awarded.

trial

is

plaintiffs

have even used

determining which jurisdiction to

to continue to trial.

As

the

inconsistency as to whether a case will

or whether the plaintiff will recover

Some

it

this

damages even though already

confusion to their advantage

in

file suit in.

Where an express agreement

is

lacking, comparative responsibility attempts to

eliminate this confusion. Based on a modified form of risk-utility analysis promulgated

in

products

there

is

liability cases,

comparative responsibility

is

applicable in situations where

an absence of a clear agreement (such as a waiver of liability) to assume the risks

of a given activity. The model presents an analysis of the

utility

of each party's conduct

against the alternatives available to each at the time of the activity to determine the scope

of fault attributable to each. Such a determination
also eliminates the presumption that,

acted in a

where both

more unreasonable manner than

Under

this

into the principles

is to

be

made by

a jury.

The model

parties acted unreasonably, the plaintiff

the defendant and thus

assumed the

risk.

model, secondary implied assumption of risk would be fully subsumed
of comparative fault already being applied in the vast majority of the
80

81

United States and

civil

law jurisdictions throughout the world.

jurisdiction that utilizes the analysis presented herein

non

fit

injuria"

would apply only

to express

would

A

comparative

find that the

fault

maxim

"volunti

agreements of willingness, and not to the

subjective analysis of behavior alone.
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Appendix

Chart of Different Forms of Assumption of Risk

What
from

it is:

A

Express
agreement of release

liability for

the agreed

Implied, 2 types

Primary

prior

upon

damages sustained during

activity

Consequences: Risk of negligence shifts
from the D to the P. D relieved of burden of
use of reasonable care.
Defeated by: Public policy considerations;
D may not use gross, wanton or reckless
behavior.

Examples: Participation in certain sporting
events, waiver of release (i.e. contract).
Adoption of comparative fault has no effect
on availability of this theory to bar P's
recovery from D.

What it is: According to Arthur Best, Comparative
Negligence: Law and Practice (1993), when a plaintiff
is

fully cognizant

of and voluntarily encounters a risk
it, nonetheless an

without expressly consenting to
implication of assent

still

occurs.

Consequences: There can be no cause of action for
negligence as the P's actions absolved D of any duty owed.
Cts. Also construe this to mean that D owed no duty
because of P's knowledge when encountering the

known

risk.

Defeated by: Public policy considerations or if D acts in a
gross, wanton or reckless manner.
Examples: Being struck by an accidentally flung bat at a
baseball game; inherent dangers ("the danger of falling trees
lurks in

all

wooded... areas," Walls

692 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1959),

cert.

v.

Lueking, 332 S.W.2d

Denied.

Some

cts.

also use

this for participants in contact sports.

Adoption of comparative

fault has led

AK, GA, NE,

RI,

SD

to abolish this theory as a defense [Best, §4.20[2][b][i]].

Secondary, 2 types (reasonable

What

it is:

"A

thorn

in

& unreasonable)

the judicial side," Blackburn

Dorta, 348 So.2d 287, 291 (Fla.1977). Occurs

when

v.

a

P

voluntarily and knowingly meets a risk negligently created

by the D. Very similar to contributory negligence (which
no longer used by the cts.).
Consequences: Bars recovery by the P.
Defeated by: Public policy considerations; whether D's

is

negligence was sufficiently greater that P's so as to allow

recovery by P (comparative negligence principles).
Examples: Construction worker stepping outside of clearly

marked

site to urinate

and struck by drunk driver speeding

on highway.

Adoption of comparative fault has led many jurisdictions
clamor for abolishing this theory.

to

Reasonable
Occurs when P's conduct
in assuming the risk was

Unreasonable
Occurs when the P's conduct
in assuming the risk deemed

reasonable.

as unreasonable.
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